The Exxon Valdez Disaster

​[00:00:00]

President of Exxon Shipping Company, Frank Iarossi: On behalf of Exxon, I wish to express our regrets for the, uh, any anxiety or inconvenience, uh, caused as a result of the grounding of Exxon Valdez. I want to also assure all of you that Exxon is mobilizing all of the resources available to mitigate the impact, uh, from this incident. And I'll talk a little bit about what is going on.

And, uh, how we plan to approach this. I also want to clearly state that Exxon has assumed full financial responsibility, uh, for the, uh, the cleanup or anything that needs to go on. Uh, and as soon as we can get our response team operational, uh, we plan also to assume operational responsibility for the salvage and cleanup.

Thanks to the very rapid response of the US Coast Guard. Uh, [00:01:00] the Department of Environmental Conservation and, uh, Ali ASCAs response teams. I think the first steps in, uh, in, uh, corralling or controlling this, uh, incident have already been initiated. And I'd like to thank those agencies for moving as quickly as they did.

Right now we have two very important objectives, and the first one is to move aggressively, to collect or disperse the oil that, uh, is on water. And time is critical, so we're moving very quickly to, uh, to get the resources in place to undertake that activity. At the same time, we're moving cautiously to, uh, remove the oil from the damaged vessel and to salvage the vessel.

Uh, safety is paramount in, in this particular regard. Uh, we need to move cautiously and carefully because the last thing in the world we want is any more oil in the water.

Rich: [00:02:00] This was the news briefing given by president of Exxon Shipping Company, Frank Iarossi on March 24th, 1989 from the Civic Center in Valdez, Alaska.

This was just hours after the oil tanker Exxon Valdez, grounded in Prince William sound, and spilled over 10 million gallons of crude oil into the environmentally sensitive area. It was the worst environmental disaster in United States history at the time. The Exxon Valdez disaster today on shipwrecks and sea dogs.

Hello and welcome to Shipwrecks and Sea Dogs. Tales of Mishaps, misfortune, and misadventure. Without question, the discovery of fossil fuels has changed our world. It has powered industry travel and commerce in general. It has provided us with the conveniences of everyday life that we have become accustomed to.

As our world has become more of a global market, those demands become even more complicated and require further innovation. Transporting fossil fuels and specifically crude oil from its point of extraction to refineries around the world does not come without its hazards. The Exxon Valez was classified as a very large crude carrier, or VLC launched in 1986 by the National Steel and Ship Building company in San Diego, California for the Exxon Shipping Company, a subsidiary of the Exxon Corporation.

At the time of her construction, she was the largest ship ever built on the west coast of North America, the first of two Alaska class tankers. She was designed to meet the modern safety standards of the time. The vessels design [00:03:00] was approved by the United States Coast Guard and the American Bureau of Shipping, and was certified by the Coast Guard for the carriage of crude oil products and flammable or combustible liquids of grade B or lower.

This would include gasoline, kerosene, oil, solvents, alcohol, and some types of paints. The ship featured all steel welded construction, a raised castle, a bulbous bow to reduce drag. And an AFT split deck house. The forward portion of the deck house included the bridge, radio room, recreation rooms, dining facilities, crew cabins, steward stores, hospital gymnasium, swimming pool, and the cargo control room.

The aft deck house included the engine and other machinery. She was 987 feet at length, 166 feet wide, and 88 feet high, measuring from the main deck to its keel. It had a maximum capacity of 1.48 million barrels [00:04:00] of crude oil per voyage. The Exxon Valez included all the bells and whistles for a ship of its time.

This included radar, internal communications, remote fire, pump, and valve controls, as well as gauges and alarms to monitor the engine room, steering room, and pump room for navigation. It had a gyro compass with a digital display, a Doppler speed log, rudder angle indicator. RPM indicator, a digital faithometer to measure depth and a wind speed indicator.

Propulsion was provided by an eight cylinder marine diesel engine with a single five bladed propeller. The tanker was put into service in 1986, transporting crude oil from the Alyeska pipeline terminal, and Valdez Alaska to the lower 48 states. At 11:35 PM on the 22nd of March, 1989. The Exxon Valdez arrived at birth number five at the Alyeska Marine terminal in Valdez.

She was scheduled to load [00:05:00] 53 million gallons or about 1.26 million barrels of Alaska North slope crude oil. The better part of the next 24 hours were spent adjusting the ballast, loading the cargo tanks, and testing the ship's systems. The ship's master was 42-year-old Captain Joseph Hazelwood. He was a graduate of SUNY Maritime College and had worked for Exxon and its predecessor, humble Oil. For 20 years.

He had served as ship's master for Exxon for 10 years and the alternate master of the Valdez for the previous two years. In 1987, the Exxon Valdez and Exxon Galveston were rated as the highest performing ships in the fleet. And in 1988, the Valdez took sole honors of that distinction.

As the Exxon Valdez was being loaded, captain Hazelwood, his chief engineer Jerzy Glowacki and radio officer Joel Roberson, went to shore while a ship was being loaded.

They [00:06:00] had lunch with the Harbor Pilot assigned to the Exxon Valdez. Captain William Murphy Hazelwood later told investigators that he had a beer with lunch. After lunch, the pilot departed to report to the ship. The other three men went their separate ways to tend to some personal errands, but Hazelwood and his two officers agreed to meet at a local bar a short time later at approximately 4:30 PM on March 23rd, the three men met at the bar where they ordered several rounds of drinks and played darts with local residents.

Roberson said he was drinking beer and the captain was drinking a clear beverage. Glowacki claimed he had three gin and tonics, but could not say how much the captain drank. The men left the bar at 7:00 PM and ordered some pizzas to take back to the ship. They went to yet another bar while waiting for their pizzas, and both Roberson and Glowacki stated that each man, including the captain, had another alcoholic [00:07:00] beverage.

They took a taxi back to the terminal, picking up another crewman along the way, and arrived at 8:24 PM. Neither the cab driver or terminal security officers believed the men were intoxicated after they arrived on the ship. They were surprised to learn that the ship was ready to depart, believing it still would be several hours until it was ready.

Captain Hazelwood then met with the ship's agent and the pilot on the bridge. While the agent didn't get any impression of Hazelwood being intoxicated, pilot William Murphy believed he smelled alcohol on hazelwood's breath. He did not believe however, that Hazelwood was impaired. A short time later, Murphy began moving the Exxon Valdez out of its birth and tugs pulled alongside to assist Captain Murphy, who was assigned by the Southwest Alaska Pilots Association was the same pilot that guided the ship in support the prior day as Murphy took the vessel toward the Valdez Narrows, [00:08:00] captain Hazelwood left the bridge.

While it isn't unheard of for a ship's master to leave the bridge, when a pilot is on board, it certainly isn't standard procedure. The master or captain still has full responsibility for the safety of the ship as the pilot's role is advisory and not command. Approaching the narrows, Murphy ordered the ship slowed to six knots and positioned the ship according to the plotted optimum track line.

The ship passed through the narrows without incident and Murphy turned the ship to degrees roughly south Southwest, toward the outbound traffic lane. As the vessel approached Rocky Point Pilot Station Murphy asked third mate, Gregory Cousins to call Captain Hazelwood back to the bridge. A few minutes later, Hazelwood entered the bridge and assumed navigational control from Murphy.

Third mate, Cousins and an Able Seaman were ordered to assist Murphy to the demarcation ladder. At 11:24 PM Murphy descended the ladder, boarded the pilot boat, and sped away at 11:25 PM Hazelwood notified the Coast Guard Vessel Traffic Center or VTC that his estimated arrival at the Naked Island checkpoint was 1:00 AM.

As he was progressing down the outbound [00:09:00] lane, he observed glacial ice coming from Columbia Bay, extending across a good portion of the channel. At 11:31, Hazelwood contacted the VTC again with the following message. At the present time, I'm going to alter my course to 2 0 0 and reduce speed to about 12 knots to wind my way through the ice.

Naked Island ETA might be a little bit out of whack. Once we're clear of the ice out of Columbia Bay. We'll give you another shout. The VTC was not required to monitor radar over six miles from its station and while they received Hazelwood's message, the Exxon Valdez was the eight miles out and was not being monitored on Radar.

Hazelwood then informed third mate Cousins that he would be turning the ship to 180 degrees to avoid the ice. And the ship's log shows that this maneuver began at 11:39 PM Hazelwood intended to veer into the incoming lane for a short time before moving back out to the outbound lane to [00:10:00] avoid the ice.

By 1152, the ship was traveling at approximately 11 knots. Hazelwood ordered the helmsman to engage the automatic pilot. The captain then placed the vessel on load program up. This is a computerized process to bring the ship from its current speed up to its full cruising speed on the Exxon Valdez. This process takes about 43 minutes.

Hazelwood then left the bridge to send some messages and do paperwork leaving. Third mate, Gregory Cousins in command. Hazelwood gave him an order to start returning to the outbound traffic lane after passing the ice when the Busby Island light was a beam on the port side. Hazelwood also requested to be contacted when this maneuver was underway.

Cousins determined by radar that there was a distance of 0.9 miles between the nearby Bligh Reef off the port bow and the ice flow up ahead. The helmsman updated Cousins with the ship's status, [00:11:00] a bearing of 180 degrees, and that the ship was on gyro or automatic pilot. Cousins was surprised to hear that the automatic pilot was engaged as this was not usually done until in open waters.

The third mate was supposed to be relieved by the second mate at 1150, but the second mate had not yet arrived on the bridge at this time. The Helmsman's shift was also over, and he was relieved by Able Seaman, Robert Kagan. Cousins, in preparation to make the turn, went to the steering stand and turned off the automatic pilot.

He observed the indicator for hand steering mode illuminate, and he went to the port bridge wing to visually observe the bus be light. At 1155, Cousins entered the chart room and plotted the ship's position as 1.1 miles from bus bee light. Abel Seaman Maureen Jones was posted at the starboard bridge wing lookout.

She spotted Bligh Reef buoy number six, about 45 degrees off the starboard. Bow [00:12:00] blinking five times per second, and she informed the third mate. He acknowledged her calmly and told her he was aware and had already located the buoy on radar. According to Cousin's testimony, he ordered 10 degrees right rudder to the helmsman and then called the captain.

As instructed, the call lasted approximately 90 seconds and Cousins stated the ship would be passing through the edge of the ice flow. Hazelwood asked if the second mate had arrived on the bridge. Cousins replied saying the second mate had still not arrived. Cousins returned to the radar after the phone call and realized the ship's heading had not changed.

It was still on its original track line. The lookout, Maureen Jones, entered again notifying Cousins of the Bligh Reef buoy, flashing every four seconds according to Cousins. He then ordered 20 degrees right rudder and watched as the rudder angle indicator swung to the right and then stop at 20 [00:13:00] degrees.

This order came about a minute after he had ordered 10 degrees right rudder. Cousins studied the radar and realized that while the ship's heading had now changed, it was still on a 180 degree course. Bligh Reef was now only about 22 degrees off the port bow. He ordered hard right rudder, and after a few seconds of watching the radar picked up the phone again nervously he told the captain, I think we're in serious trouble.

Later, the bottom of the ship scraped along the reef, causing the ship to roll slightly. About 45 seconds later, a series of sharp jolts could be felt throughout the ship for about 10 seconds. Cousins then ordered hard left rudder, but the helmsman hesitated. Unresponsive Cousins grabbed the helm himself and frantically spun the wheel trying to prevent the stern from swinging around.

But the ship continued to swing around to the right after grounding. At 12:05 AM on March 24th, 1989, the Exxon Valdez came to a stop [00:14:00] grounded on Bligh Reef at a heading of 289 degrees or roughly West Northwest. Captain Hazelwood recalled the moment I was sitting at the desk in my office and it just started to shake, not a violent shake, but a very strange vibration.

At that moment, the phone rang. It was the third mate. He said we were in trouble and I took off. When I got up to the bridge, there were loud bells and sirens. I had a pretty good idea. We had run a ground. I threw up in the toilet adjacent to the bridge. I felt like I got kicked right in the stomach. After composing himself, Hazelwood issued various orders to the Helmsman in an effort to free the ship from the reef.

He then contacted the vehicle traffic control at 12:27 AM. Notifying them that the Exxon Valdez was grounded on Bligh Reef and leaking oil. [00:15:00] Uh.

Be here for a while. Right now we're trying to her up and, uh, get back to you as soon as we can. Over the Coast Guard, captain of the Port, then closed the Port of Valdez to all traffic. The extent of the damage and the oil leak was not yet known, but the chief mate inspected the cargo areas and found all of the center and starboard cargo holds were breached and rapidly discharging while the starboard ballast tanks were filling in Just that short time, over a hundred thousand barrels of oil had spilled into the sea.

The chief mate presented Hazelwood with calculations showing that the ship was not safe to move, and the Coast Guard captain of the port advised him not to do anything drastic. [00:16:00] Still Hazelwood continued to issue orders. Slow ahead, half ahead, full ahead. Finally, at 1:41 AM he said, this isn't going to work.

We better stop. And the engines were shut down. At 3:35 AM the executive Officer and the senior investigating officer of the Coast Guard's Valdez Marine Safety Office, boarded the Exxon Valdez. Captain Hazelwood explained he had issued an order for a gentle turn to slip past the ice when the ship was grounded significantly.

During this conversation, both officers reported smelling alcohol on Hazelwood's breath. The investigating officer described a very strong smell of stale alcohol. When asked about the smell of alcohol, Hazelwood explained that he drank two Moussy beers. This is a non-alcoholic brand of beer from Switzerland.

Technically, it has an alcohol [00:17:00] content of 0.05%, which is virtually non-alcoholic. Two empty Moussy beer bottles were indeed found in a wastebasket in the Captain's state room. Two of these beverages could never intoxicate a person. The executive officer then contacted the CO at the Coast Guard and requested toxicology samples to be taken from the captain and other personnel.

This didn't occur until 10:30 AM on March 24th, over 10 hours after the Exxon Valdez was grounded. The results indicated Captain Hazelwood had a blood alcohol level of 0.061% and a urine alcohol content of 0.094%, both well over the legal limit allowed by the US Coast Guard. The lookout, Maureen Jones Helmsman, Robert Kagan, and Third Mae Gregory Cousins were also tested and their results all came back with zeros across the board.

The crew began taking soundings of the oil and [00:18:00] ballast tanks and prepared lightering equipment to transfer the oil to other vessels. Exxon hired diver Rick Wade to survey the damage. Eight of 11 cargo tanks were ripped. Open center cargo holds 1, 2, 3, and four were ripped open along their entire lengths.

Hold number five, received the least damage. A large section of the starboard side had lost its plating. Longitudinal beams were bent and crushed, and a large boulder was lodged in the hall in the starboard side. Wade reported the side of the ship was ripped open like a tuna can, and he could drive his boat into the opening.

Thankfully, there were no injuries to the crew of the Exxon Valdez. The majority of the oil spill occurred within the first eight hours of its grounding before the cruise could begin Lightering. It was 14 hours before an emergency containment crew arrived, and 20 hours before a boom could be placed around the spill site.

A boom is the floating material you see on the water [00:19:00] surrounding an oil spill, and they are designed to keep the oil from spreading. Lightering began on the morning of March 25th when the Exxon Baton Rouge pulled alongside the vessel and took on about half of the oil cargo. The Exxon, San Francisco arrived the following day and took on the remaining oil.

It took Exxon several days to get the cleanup fully up and running due, at least in part to the remote location of the spill. Thousands of workers were hired to clean the oil from the shoreline, and marine biologists were hired to help clean and care for the wildlife. A whole host of experts across many disciplines were brought into consult on the cleanup and the wildlife rehabilitation.

The crude oil proved to be horribly toxic and shocking. Images of black oil soaked wildlife filled our television screens in the aftermath, but the chemicals used to disperse the oil were also of concern. The public became extremely concerned when a helicopter dropped a chemical mixture of solvent and [00:20:00] surfactant that missed the spill.

People were skeptical on the safety of the chemicals being used. It was later determined that the chemical 2-butoxyethanol indeed is a respiratory irritant that can be acutely toxic. Eventually, the effort included 100 airplanes and helicopters, 1000 boats and 10,000 workers. The result of the oil spill was a tragic environmental disaster.

10.8 million gallons of crude oil were dumped into Prince William Sound covering 1300 miles of pristine coastline, thousands of sea otters, eagles, harbor seals, orcas, harlean, ducks, and a variety of seabirds were killed after being covered in oil. It is estimated that up to 250,000 seabirds alone were killed.

Many species of birds, fish, and other wildlife were negatively impacted for decades to come. [00:21:00] In turn, commercial fishing, tourism, and related industries were also severely affected. The National Transportation Safety Board launched its investigation of the Exxon Valdez. Almost immediately, Exxon provided investigators with Joseph Hazelwood's individual disability report from 1985.

Hazelwood was admitted to a hospital on April 2nd, 1985. The report describes he is a 38-year-old white male who has been depressed and demoralized. He's been drinking excessively episodically, which resulted in familial and vocational dysfunction, alcoholics anonymous meetings, and a leave of absence from work.

Were recommended. The report indicates Hazelwood was on disability leave from April 1st through May 15th, 1985, and then placed on a leave of absence for 90 days starting May 16th, 1985. Exxon personnel were assigned [00:22:00] to follow up with Hazelwood, and they did so every two weeks. For two years, Hazelwood was described as clean at the time of his monitoring.

Keep in mind, Joseph Hazelwood was one of two captains of the Exxon Valdez. When it was among the top rated vessels in the fleet the two years prior to the accident, NTSB investigators also searched Hazelwood's driving record and found two instances of driving while intoxicated. One was in 1984, but the other was in 1988 after his monitoring period had ended.

It was also learned from the chief engineer that Hazelwood was going through a difficult divorce at the time of the accident. The ship's radio officer testified to seeing Hazelwood drinking in the crew lounge during the previous voyage in February of 1989. The Exxon shipping company's policy on drug and alcohol use was extremely strict.

A written policy dated March 11th, 1987 prohibited the [00:23:00] use, possession, distribution, or sale of drugs and alcohol on company premises. Being unfit for duty because of the use of drugs or alcohol is forbidden and cause for termination. Joseph Hazelwood was fired by Exxon following the Exxon Valdez accident.

Hazelwood faced a massive negative media blitz which publicized his alcohol problems and passed DWIs. He was the only person to be charged criminally regarding the accident. Not a single witness testified that Hazelwood was intoxicated. All of his crew described him as calm in control, and perfectly capable of commanding the vessel.

His defense argued that the toxicology results were invalid due to the delay in testing. Hazelwood was ultimately acquitted of all charges except a misdemeanor charge of negligent discharge of oil. Following the verdict, Hazelwood said This has been long and difficult. I [00:24:00] just want to get back to see.

It's what I do. He paid a $50,000 fine, served 1000 hours of community service in Alaska, and the US Coast Guard suspended his Master's license for nine months, actually caused the accident. Why did the ship hit the reef? According to third mate, Gregory Cousins, he ordered 10 degree right rudder when the Busby light was abeam to port as ordered.

The computer aided operations research facility at the National Maritime Research Center at Kings Point, New York conducted a study of the pre-accident maneuvers on the Exxon Valdez using the facility ship simulator. Data recorded from the ship's log were used in the schematics and characteristics of the Exxon Valdez were entered for the simulation results showed that the Exxon Valdez passed a beam of the Busby light at 11:55 PM at a distance of 0.9 miles.

According to Third Mate Cousins, he began his turn at this time, however, the simulation shows the turn from 180 degrees toward Bligh Reef did not begin until [00:25:00] 12:01 AM at a distance of 1.4 miles past Busby light 10 degree, right rudder was used for about 30 seconds and then the rudder was eased back one or more times to slow the rate of turn.

The simulation indicates that at 12:06 AM. Very little right rudder or perhaps even a port rudder was being used. The end result was a turn to starboard of about four or five degrees. Cousins claimed he ordered a 20 degree right rudder and then hard right rudder after he noticed the ship was still heading at 180 degrees.

However, the data and simulation show no evidence that these maneuvers were ever applied. If he did order them, the helmsman did not respond to them. Furthermore, the simulation indicated that if the 10 degree right rudder were applied throughout the entire turn without any counter rudder applied, the vessel would have safely cleared.

the reef. Had even a four degree turn began at the proper [00:26:00] time. A beam to the Busby light. The ship would have safely cleared the reef data from the course recorder showed the Exxon Valdez was on a 180 degree track for 18 minutes. And remained very straight until 12:01 AM when it began a slow swing to starboard.

So what does all this mean? The third mate initiated the 10 degree turn later than ordered by Captain Hazelwood, and later than he himself claimed the helmsman possibly on his own accord, eased up on the rudder and perhaps even applied a counter rudder, which slowed the rate of turn quite simply. The vessel grounded because a turn was not initiated by the third mate in time to avoid striking Bligh Reef.

However, captain Hazelwood had left a junior officer on the bridge and in command. The Exxon Shipping Company's Bridge Organization manual dictated that while a vessel was operating in traffic lanes, coming in, or going out of port, the vessel was under watch condition [00:27:00] c. In such conditions, the master or chief mate must be on the bridge and in charge of the watch at all times.

Furthermore, the watch officer is to be responsible for fixing the vessel's position and assisting the master or chief mate as directed. Third mate, Gregory Cousins was left alone with the Helmsman on the bridge. Investigators also uncovered that third mate, Gregory Cousins, had worked unusually long hours at the time of the accident.

Cousins testified that he had gotten to sleep the night before at 1:00 AM and Rose at 7:20 AM for his 8:00 AM watch. He worked until 1:30 PM when he took a short nap and then relieved the chief mate at 5:00 PM He remained on duty either on the bridge or assisting with other duties until the time of the accident.

A pump man who had talked with Cousins earlier that evening testified that Cousins appeared to be fatigued. Another able seaman reported hearing that the [00:28:00] ship's second mate was very tired and this is why the third mate remained on duty past midnight. The NTSB released its final report on July 31st, 1990.

It is an extensive document and included 47 conclusions. Based on the evidence the probable cause of the accident was stated. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the grounding of the Exxon Valdez. The failure of the third mate to properly maneuver the vessel because of fatigue and excessive workload.

The failure of the master to provide a proper navigation watch because of impairment from alcohol. The failure of Exxon Shipping Company to provide a fit master, and a rested and sufficient crew for the Exxon Valdez, the lack of an effective vessel traffic service because of inadequate equipment and manning levels.

Inadequate personnel training and deficient management oversight, and the lack of effective pilotage services. The report [00:29:00] includes many pages of recommendations. These include changes for shipping companies to eliminate policies that reward or encourage crew members to work long hours and to have greater oversight regarding the number of hours worked.

Many more recommendations included more oversight by the Coast Guard to certify qualified officers. Tighter restrictions for operation in Prince William Sound, drug and alcohol testing, expanded radar monitoring and improved emergency response. A series of lawsuits, judgements and appeals en sued in the coming years.

Ultimately, Exxon was forced to pay punitive damages of $507.5 million, plus another $900 million in civil settlements. This is in addition to the $2 billion it's spent on cleanup efforts. While these amounts are staggering, they are just one 10th of the original judgments. Before many rounds of appeals prompting many to believe Exxon was not punished harshly [00:30:00] enough for the damage done, calling it an insult to the people of Alaska, and a slap on the wrist.

For Exxon, the public was enraged and demanded answers. Politicians in Washington and in local governments postured for greater accountability and better safety measures. Governor of Alaska, Steve Calper ordered a special commission to investigate the disaster. Its results were released in January of 1990.

It included criticism of Exxon, the US Coast Guard, the state of Alaska itself, and the entire regulatory system responsible for the transportation of oil. The oil pollution Act of 1990 was signed into law by President George HW Bush, at least in part due to the Exxon Valdez disaster. Among other provisions, the act phased out single hole tankers by 2015 and required all new tankers and barges to be double-hulled and vessels to develop and submit detailed plans for responding to large oil [00:31:00] discharges.

Broadened financial responsibility requirements for those involved in oil handling and transportation, and created a trust fund financed by a tax on oil to help pay for spill response when responsible parties cannot or will not. In addition to this, Exxon instituted mandatory drug testing for those in critical positions.

The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from ships known as marpol, is a key international marine environmental convention aimed at minimizing pollution of the oceans and seas from ships. This includes pollution from oil, chemicals, garbage, sewage, and air emissions. As of twenty twenty five, one hundred and sixty member nations have ratified the convention.

It has taken some time, but wildlife around Prince William sound has partially recovered. While some species populations have bounced back, such as harbor seals and sockeye salmon, other species are struggling [00:32:00] herring. Once a huge industry in the area virtually disappeared. It wasn't until 2024 that a herring harvest was permitted.

And it was a small fraction of what it was prior to the oil spill. Globs of sticky black oil can still be found a few inches under the sand along the shores of Prince William Sound. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration continues to monitor the situation and only time will tell what the long-term effects will be of the Exxon Valdez oil spill.

Exxon went on to merge with Mobil to become Exxon Mobil, now the second largest oil company in the world. As for the Exxon Valdez itself, it was towed to San Diego where major repairs were completed. It was placed back in service in early 1990 and renamed the Exxon Mediterrean. Exxon then transferred its shipping business to its subsidiary, River Maritime, and the vessel was renamed again to Sea River, Mediterranean.[00:33:00]

It was prohibited by law from operating in Prince William Sound, and was transferred to service in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. In 2008, the vessel was sold to Hong Kong Bloom shipping. It was renamed again to Dong Fang Ocean and was registered in Panama. In 2012, the ship was sold for scrap to Global Marketing Systems, Inc.

For $16 million. After changing hands several times between scrap merchants, she ended up with the Indian firm, Priya Blue Industries, and renamed Oriental nicely. It was beached at allowing India on August 2nd, 2012, where it was dismantled. Captain Joseph Hazelwood issued a public apology to the people of Alaska in 2009 and spoke with CNN Anchor Kira Phillips in 2014 about the Exxon Valdez disaster.

He was subdued and remorseful, sometimes appearing on the verge of breaking down. When asked why he agreed to talk on [00:34:00] television, he replied to show I'm a human being. I think I just want to be heard. Following the accident, he attended Alcoholic Anonymous meetings, but at the time of this interview, he did not believe he was ever addicted to alcohol.

He admitted to having three vodka drinks on the day of the accident, but said he was not intoxicated. He told Phillips the only thing I would've changed if I could rewrite that whole script as I wouldn't have left the bridge. That's what I should be faulted for. Nothing else. Joseph Hazelwood didn't blame anyone but himself for the Exxon Valdez disaster, saying the responsibility doesn't go away.

It's a burden I've chosen. Hazelwood was unable to find long-term work as a captain following the disaster. He was hired by his alma mater, SUNY Maritime as an instructor, aboard the training vessel. Empire State five and later worked as a consultant for the law firm, Chalos and Brown, the same firm that defended him during his [00:35:00] trial.

Joseph Hazelwood died on July 21st, 2022 at age 75, reportedly suffering from cancer and COVID-19. At the time, the Exxon Valdez oil spill was the worst environmental disaster in United States history until the BP Deep Water Horizon explosion in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010.

​

[00:36:00]

Rich: That's going to do it for the Exxon Valdez disaster. Thank you so much for listening. Shipwrecks and Sea Dogs is written, edited, and produced by me. Rich Napolitano original theme music is by Sean Siegfried, and you can find him@seansiegfried.com. For ad free listening, please consider joining the Officers Club on Patreon at patreon.com/shipwrecks pod.

For $5 a month, you'll get at least two bonus episodes a month and all episodes ad free. All episodes show notes and even merchandise can be found at shipwrecks and sea dogs.com. If you haven't already, please remember to rate and review on Apple Podcast, Spotify or wherever you get your podcasts. I will greatly appreciate it.

Please join me again next time, but until then, don't forget to wear your life jackets.