The OceanGate Titan Submersible: A Preventable Tragedy - Part 1

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The following recording took 
place at Ocean Gates 

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headquarters in Everett, WA on 
January 19th, 2018. 

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In attendance were founder and 
CEO Stockton Rush, Director of 

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Marine Operations David 
Lockridge, Director of 

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engineering Tony Neeson, 
Director of Finance and Human 

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resources Bonnie Carl, and 
Director of Logistics and 

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Quality Assurance Scott 
Griffith. 

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The meeting was in reference to 
a quality inspection and 

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subsequent report performed by 
David Lockridge, who documented 

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many problems and concerns with 
the Titan submersible. 

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OK, so as the intention to best 
efforts get it scanned or are we

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just not doing what? 
What is the reason we're not 

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trying to get it scanned? 
Because the data we would get 

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from a scan would not be 
meaningful. 

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Does it not alarm you seeing 
what we see? 

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It doesn't concern you, not at 
all. 

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Because carbon fiber is better 
in compression than tension. 

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And that's what nobody 
understands. 

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It's completely opposite of 
everyone else says. 

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Everyone says oh, carbon fiber 
can't handle compression. 

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They're full of shit and I've 
proven them to be full of shit. 

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This project is not for 
everyone, OK? 

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And the question is it it what 
I'm getting down to, It's 

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clearly not an approach that 
you're comfortable with. 

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You don't want to be associated 
with it. 

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You don't want me to die. 
And have you said I don't want 

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to be associated with that? 
I am highlighting my safety 

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concerns, which as an employee 
of the company, I've been here 

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for nearly three years now, 
stopped and I have seen the way 

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it works. 
I am addressing what I view as 

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safety concerns, concerns I have
mentioned verbally, which have 

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been dismissed by everybody. 
I have I, no, I've listened to 

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them and I have given you my 
response to them. 

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And you think my response is 
inadequate, correct. 

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OK. 
So that's the impact for it. 

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I've been fighting this thing 
since I started this business 

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and I don't want to fight with 
you and I don't want to put you 

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in a position that you are 
feeling like you've been 

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badgered into signing off of me 
going and killing myself. 

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But I can't have you here to 
work on a project that you think

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has the potential to kill me and
destroy an industry and 

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participate in that activity. 
And I'm not going to do what you

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want. 
That's the impasse. 

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That's stop. 
We're not getting answers. 

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We're not getting correct 
answers. 

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It's just it's been a problem. 
And that has been a problem 

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since day one and we have been 
trying to make it work. 

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And the fact is, I know I'm 
getting all the answers and I'm 

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the guy who's listening to 
everything that Tony's saying, 

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everything that will Conan's 
saying, everything that Boeing's

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saying ATKGD. 
I'm the guy who's collecting all

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that thing. 
OK, It sits here. 

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And if you don't have confidence
in the CEO, then this is a long 

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place to be. 
And that's what it comes down 

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to. 
I want this project to work. 

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I came over here for this 
project. 

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Stalton, I understand you. 
You want this project to work. 

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I am telling you, I understand 
that you're not going to get 

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comfortable with my approach. 
I disagree with you on 

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decisions. 
I understand. 

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What would make you comfortable 
with continuing to be the 

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director of Marine operations 
Here is it? 

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Are you? 
I have to have the whole 

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scanned. 
I have to. 

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I would like the whole scanned. 
Yes, absolutely. 

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You have made it clear these 
things have to be addressed to 

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your satisfaction, not to my 
satisfaction to your 

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satisfaction. 
And, and, and, and on top of 

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that, there's no way you're 
going to be comfortable with me 

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going in the sub having you have
such a deep seated opinion that 

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the approach that we are taking 
and I am pushing is the wrong 1 

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is not something we can deal 
with as a company. 

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I mean, I can't have the 
director of marine OPS not have 

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confidence in the test plan or 
the construction of the vessel 

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that he's in charge of. 
I mean, you can see it from my 

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perspective. 
That just wouldn't work. 

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I'm not going to bend. 
You're not going to bend. 

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I like you and I respect you. 
We do have disagreements a lot, 

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but what the heck, for the sake 
of paying some money and doing 

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some researching, get this thing
checked out. 

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We're not going to rehash this 
thing. 

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I don't want anybody in this 
company who is uncomfortable 

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with what we're doing. 
There are a lot of people out 

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there who are excited about 
doing it and but I don't want to

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force people. 
This is we're doing weird in 

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here and I'm and I am definitely
out of the mold. 

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There's no question. 
I'm doing things that are 

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completely non standard. 
And I'm sure the industry thinks

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I'm an idiot and I know Patrick 
Leahy's telling everybody we're 

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stupid fools. 
That's fine. 

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They've been doing that for 
eight years and and I'm going to

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continue on the way I'm doing, 
but I'm not going to force 

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people to join my religion if if
they don't want to. 

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You're going to be highly 
uncomfortable if we continue 

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down this path to the level of 
it's, it's not appropriate for 

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me to put you in that position 
for me to go do stuff that you 

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think is insane that I'm going 
to kill myself with a vehicle 

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that hasn't been checked out to 
the way you want. 

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And I'm going to try somehow 
have him be associated with that

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and overlook it, which he won't 
do. 

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I have no desire to die. 
I got a nice granddaughter. 

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I am going to be around. 
I understand this kind of risk 

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and I'm going into it with eyes 
open and I think this is one of 

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the safest things I will ever 
do. 

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I am not dying. 
No one's dying under my watch. 

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The Ocean Gate Titan 
submersible, A preventable 

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tragedy today on shipwrecks and 
sea dogs. 

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Hello and welcome to Shipwrecks 
and Sea Dogs, tales of mishaps, 

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misfortune, and misadventure. 
I'm your host, Rich Napolitano. 

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The story of the Titan 
submersible is the most 

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requested story I've had in my 
almost four years of doing this 

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podcast. 
It's a big story. 

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It's a tragic story and a very 
frustrating story. 

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To understand the catastrophic 
failure of Ocean Gates Titan 

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Submersible, there is only one 
place to start, and that is with

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its founder and CEO, Stockton 
Rush. 

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If the United States had a 
classic aristocracy, Stockton 

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Rush's family would be included 
with the likes of the Astors, 

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the Melons, Kennedys, and 
Vanderbilts. 

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His father's heritage can be 
traced back to two original 

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signers of the Declaration of 
Independence, Richard Stockton 

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and Benjamin Rush, and he is 
named obviously in honor of 

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these men. 
Richard Stockton was a wealthy 

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landowner from New Jersey and 
was partially responsible for 

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the establishment of Princeton 
University. 

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Benjamin Rush was an influential
politician from Pennsylvania as 

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well as a social reformer, 
educator and Co founder of 

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Dickinson College. 
On Russia's mother's side, his 

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grandfather was Ralph K Davies, 
who is director of Standard Oil 

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of San Francisco and later 
chairman of American President 

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Shipping Lines. 
San Francisco Symphony Hall was 

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named after his wife, 
philanthropist Louise M Davies. 

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Money, power and influence were 
not in short supply throughout 

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his family's history. 
Richard Stockton Rush the Third 

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was born on March 31st, 1962 in 
San Francisco, the youngest of 

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five children to Richard 
Stockton Rush Junior and Allen 

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Margaret Davies. 
His father, who was known as 

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Talk, was chairman of Peregrine 
Oil and Gas. 

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To give you an idea of the level
of prestige and power in the 

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Rush family, Talk was a member 
and later president of the Super

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secretive private gentlemen's 
club, Bohemian Grove. 

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This is a privately owned 
campground in a Redwood forest 

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near Monte Rio, CA. 
Every July, some of the world's 

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richest and most powerful elite 
come together for a multi week 

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gathering, although their 
purpose and their activities are

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highly guarded by a full time 
year round security team. 

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Stockton Rush grew up in San 
Francisco with his family 

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mingling among the city's elite.
As a child, he wanted to be an 

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astronaut and dreamed of being 
the first person to set foot on 

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Mars. 
As an adolescent, he developed 

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an interest in aviation and 
underwater exploration and began

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scuba diving at age 12. 
He earned his pilot license at 

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age 18 and at 19, became the 
youngest jet transport rated 

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pilot in the world when he 
obtained his DC-8 type captain's

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rating at the United Airlines 
Jet Training Institute. 

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However, he soon learned that a 
defect in his vision would 

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prohibit him from a career in 
aviation. 

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Still, these activities showed 
his passion for adventure and 

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desire to explore the unknown, a
characteristic that would follow

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him throughout his whole life. 
Rush attended Princeton 

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University, receiving a Bachelor
of Science and Engineering 

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degree in 1984 with a 
specialization in aerospace 

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engineering. 
After a brief stint working for 

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McDonnell Douglas as a flight 
test engineer, he returned to 

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California and earned his MBA 
from the University of 

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California, Berkeley in 1989. 
Rush later told Smithsonian 

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Magazine about this time in his 
life, saying, I had this 

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epiphany that this was not at 
all what I wanted to do. 

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I didn't want to go up into 
space as a tourist. 

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I wanted to be Captain Kirk on 
the Enterprise. 

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I wanted to explore Stockton. 
Rush married Wendy Weill in 

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1986, whom he met at Princeton, 
and they went on to have two 

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children. 
Wendy herself comes from a 

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wealthy family. 
She is the great, great 

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granddaughter of Isidor and Ida 
Strauss Co, owners of Macy's 

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department store. 
Wendy also has a connection to 

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the Titanic. 
Both Isador and Ida died when it

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sank in 1912. 
In 1989, Stockton Rush purchased

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a kit for an experimental single
engine airplane, the Glass Air 

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3, and built it himself from the
600 page manual he flew this 

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plane off in for the rest of his
life. 

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That same year, Rush relocated 
to the Pacific Northwest to 

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serve as Chairman of Remote 
Control Technologies in 

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Kirkland, WA, and as a board 
member for Blueview Technologies

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of Seattle, a sonar 
manufacturing company. 

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He continued his hobby of scuba 
diving and frequently explored 

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the waters of Puget Sound, but 
in 2006, his interest in 

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underwater exploration began in 
earnest. 

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After his first submarine 
excursion, he immediately saw 

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the economic potential and a 
path to satisfy his passion for 

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exploration. 
With his background in 

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engineering, he embraced new 
technologies and scientific 

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advances to support his vision. 
Rush first attempted to purchase

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a submersible, but was 
frustrated by the lack of 

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privately owned submersibles in 
the world. 

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Instead, he purchased parts from
a london-based firm along with 

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the blueprints and built a 
heavily modified Kittredge K-350

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which he named SUDS. 
This was a two man submersible 4

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meters in length that could dive
up to 10 meters. 

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This simply scratched the 
surface and Rush wanted more. 

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In 2007, he started plans to 
form his own company to build 

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submersibles. 
In 2009, this came to fruition 

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when he and entrepreneur 
Guillermo Sondline founded Ocean

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Gate Inc. 
Rush later said. 

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I had come across this business 
anomaly and I couldn't explain. 

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If 2/3 of the planet is water, 
how come you can't access it? 

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This statement foreshadows the 
entrepreneurial attitude 

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Stockton Rush had toward ocean 
exploration. 

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For him, this was a business 
opportunity to fill an unmet 

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market demand for private ocean 
exploration. 

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There is nothing inherently 
malicious about this, and if 

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done responsibly, a for profit 
venture such as Ocean Gate could

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provide not only private 
exploration but serve as a tool 

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for scientific study. 
The stated goal of Ocean Gate 

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was to use commercial tourism to
fund the development of new deep

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diving submersibles that would 
enable further commercial 

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ventures, including resource 
mining and disaster mitigation. 

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00:15:30,560 --> 00:15:35,000
An important driver for Stockton
Rush was to do things 

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differently, defy convention and
create a unique submersible out 

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of materials never used before 
for this purpose. 

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Advances in technology would 
spur innovation and drive his 

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00:15:45,760 --> 00:15:48,840
business. 
The charismatic and headstrong 

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00:15:48,840 --> 00:15:51,840
leader of Ocean Gate believed 
fear was the only limiting 

224
00:15:51,840 --> 00:15:55,680
factor to innovation, especially
in the specialized niche of 

225
00:15:55,680 --> 00:15:59,120
submersible building. 
Limited competition didn't 

226
00:15:59,120 --> 00:16:02,320
encourage experimentation, he 
thought, and he was going to 

227
00:16:02,320 --> 00:16:05,040
change that. 
The public perception he 

228
00:16:05,040 --> 00:16:08,400
believed that submersibles were 
dangerous caused the slowly 

229
00:16:08,400 --> 00:16:10,920
developing industry of private 
ocean exploration. 

230
00:16:11,800 --> 00:16:15,080
He also blamed increased 
regulations on submersibles and 

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00:16:15,080 --> 00:16:18,680
criticized the Passenger Vessel 
Safety Act of 1993. 

232
00:16:19,440 --> 00:16:22,280
This law regulated the 
construction of ocean tourism 

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00:16:22,280 --> 00:16:27,080
vessels and prohibited dives 
below 150 feet or about 46 

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00:16:27,080 --> 00:16:31,560
meters, telling Smithsonian 
Magazine in 2019 that the law 

235
00:16:31,560 --> 00:16:35,680
quote needlessly prioritized 
passenger safety over commercial

236
00:16:35,680 --> 00:16:39,880
innovation. 
In 2011, Ocean Gates website 

237
00:16:39,880 --> 00:16:41,400
included the following 
statement. 

238
00:16:42,040 --> 00:16:47,080
Since 1974, there has not been a
serious injury or fatality on an

239
00:16:47,080 --> 00:16:50,160
American Bureau of Shipping 
certified passenger submersible 

240
00:16:50,320 --> 00:16:53,520
calling them quote the safest 
vehicles on the planet. 

241
00:16:55,160 --> 00:16:58,800
Rush was also quite frank about 
exploiting the 230 mile 

242
00:16:58,800 --> 00:17:01,240
exclusive economic zone 
surrounding the coast of the 

243
00:17:01,240 --> 00:17:05,000
United States and finding oil 
and gas reserves, rare minerals 

244
00:17:05,000 --> 00:17:11,480
or diamonds, and rare chemicals.
In 2009, Ocean Gate purchased 

245
00:17:11,480 --> 00:17:14,440
its first submersible, the 
Antipodes, from Hoffman Yacht 

246
00:17:14,440 --> 00:17:20,640
Sales for a reported $295,000. 
This vessel was built in 1973, 

247
00:17:20,760 --> 00:17:23,720
originally as a vehicle for 
commercial divers working on the

248
00:17:23,720 --> 00:17:27,880
oil fields in the North Sea. 
After several redesigns and 

249
00:17:27,880 --> 00:17:32,040
improvements, it was rated for 
depths up to 1000 feet or 305 

250
00:17:32,040 --> 00:17:34,320
meters by the time Ocean Gate 
acquired it. 

251
00:17:35,200 --> 00:17:41,240
Between 2010 and 2013, Antipodes
made 130 dives taking paying 

252
00:17:41,240 --> 00:17:44,880
customers on various excursions,
with passengers paying anywhere 

253
00:17:44,880 --> 00:17:49,400
from 7500 to $40,000. 
During this time, paying 

254
00:17:49,400 --> 00:17:52,800
customers were not referred to 
as customers, passengers or 

255
00:17:52,800 --> 00:17:56,600
clients, but instead they were 
called citizen scientists. 

256
00:17:58,040 --> 00:18:02,680
In 2013, Guillermo Somline left 
Ocean Gate citing the company 

257
00:18:02,680 --> 00:18:05,680
was transitioning from operating
a fleet of excursion 

258
00:18:05,680 --> 00:18:09,360
submersibles to engineering its 
own custom built vehicles, and 

259
00:18:09,360 --> 00:18:11,400
that was not his area of 
expertise. 

260
00:18:12,520 --> 00:18:16,240
Somline retained 500,000 shares 
of common stock in Ocean Gate, 

261
00:18:16,560 --> 00:18:19,360
but no longer was involved with 
operations after this point. 

262
00:18:21,040 --> 00:18:24,160
Stockton Rush was heavily keen 
on using carbon fiber for the 

263
00:18:24,160 --> 00:18:27,760
construction of a new innovative
deep ocean submersible that 

264
00:18:27,760 --> 00:18:32,600
could take passengers 12,500 
feet or 3800 meters down to the 

265
00:18:32,600 --> 00:18:36,040
Titanic. 
To achieve this goal, Ocean Gate

266
00:18:36,040 --> 00:18:38,720
planned to build its first 
submersible, which it would name

267
00:18:38,720 --> 00:18:41,800
the Cyclops. 
However, the company ended up 

268
00:18:41,800 --> 00:18:44,920
purchasing a 12 year old 
submarine named Lula and used 

269
00:18:44,920 --> 00:18:47,600
its steel pressure hall to 
create Cyclops 1. 

270
00:18:47,840 --> 00:18:52,240
Launched in 2015, the five 
person submersible was rated for

271
00:18:52,240 --> 00:18:55,920
depths up to 500 meters and was 
used primarily for research and 

272
00:18:55,920 --> 00:18:58,600
training, as well as a small 
number of commercial missions 

273
00:18:58,600 --> 00:19:02,440
over several years. 
At this time, Ocean Gate began 

274
00:19:02,440 --> 00:19:05,280
developing plans to take people 
on excursions to the wreck of 

275
00:19:05,280 --> 00:19:10,080
the Titanic. 
Between 1991 and 2005, the two 

276
00:19:10,080 --> 00:19:12,680
Russian mere submersibles 
brought tourists down to the 

277
00:19:12,680 --> 00:19:15,520
Titanic and even filmed the 
massive wreck for James 

278
00:19:15,520 --> 00:19:19,480
Cameron's feature film. 
And in 2010, Deep Ocean 

279
00:19:19,480 --> 00:19:23,480
Expeditions LED 12 day dives, 
taking 20 tourists at a time to 

280
00:19:23,480 --> 00:19:26,880
the wreck at a cost of $59,000 
per person. 

281
00:19:27,640 --> 00:19:30,800
Stockton Rush wanted Ocean Gate 
to be the next and most 

282
00:19:30,800 --> 00:19:33,640
innovative company to take 
people on dives to the Titanic. 

283
00:19:34,680 --> 00:19:38,520
In 2015, Ocean Gate moved its 
headquarters to the waterfront 

284
00:19:38,520 --> 00:19:43,760
of Everett, WA, and in 2016 Rush
took the Cyclops One on a test 

285
00:19:43,760 --> 00:19:47,480
dive to the wreck of the Italian
liner Andrea Doria off Nantucket

286
00:19:47,480 --> 00:19:52,000
Island. 
The Andrea Doria lies 160 to 250

287
00:19:52,000 --> 00:19:55,040
feet underwater and so this was 
not a deep sea test. 

288
00:19:55,480 --> 00:19:58,480
However, the test dive did prove
to be significant. 

289
00:19:59,720 --> 00:20:03,280
Aboard Cyclops 1 was Stockton 
Rush and Ocean Gate Marine 

290
00:20:03,280 --> 00:20:05,280
Operations Director David 
Lockridge. 

291
00:20:06,240 --> 00:20:09,960
Rush insisted on piloting the 
sub despite Lockridge having far

292
00:20:09,960 --> 00:20:12,000
more experience piloting 
submersibles. 

293
00:20:12,600 --> 00:20:15,520
Rush brought the vessel far too 
close to the wreck, which is 

294
00:20:15,520 --> 00:20:18,720
known to be highly unstable and 
very dangerous, even as 

295
00:20:18,720 --> 00:20:21,640
Lockridge and the passengers on 
board became nervous and voiced 

296
00:20:21,640 --> 00:20:24,440
their displeasure. 
When Lockridge reminded Rush not

297
00:20:24,440 --> 00:20:28,280
to get too close, Rush was 
annoyed and replied don't tell 

298
00:20:28,280 --> 00:20:31,040
me what to do. 
Rush then brought the sub 

299
00:20:31,040 --> 00:20:34,120
directly under the bow within 
just meters of striking the 

300
00:20:34,120 --> 00:20:37,280
vessel. 
Lockridge was irate and demanded

301
00:20:37,280 --> 00:20:39,920
control while Rush kept saying 
we're stuck. 

302
00:20:40,840 --> 00:20:43,880
Lockridge made several attempts 
to take the controller away, but

303
00:20:43,880 --> 00:20:47,560
each time Rush refused. 
One of the paying customers on 

304
00:20:47,560 --> 00:20:51,200
board finally screamed at Rush. 
Give me the effing controller. 

305
00:20:51,280 --> 00:20:54,960
With tears in her eyes, Rush 
then threw the controller at 

306
00:20:54,960 --> 00:20:57,680
Lockridge, which struck him on 
the head and fell to the floor, 

307
00:20:57,920 --> 00:20:59,560
which caused a button to break 
off. 

308
00:21:00,320 --> 00:21:03,280
After quickly fixing the 
controller, Lockridge piloted 

309
00:21:03,280 --> 00:21:06,200
the vessel safely away from the 
wreck about 50 meters. 

310
00:21:06,880 --> 00:21:09,600
Grateful passengers thanked him 
for moving them out of harm's 

311
00:21:09,600 --> 00:21:13,200
way, although Rush later thanked
Lockridge for getting them out 

312
00:21:13,200 --> 00:21:15,480
of trouble. 
Lockridge was furious and 

313
00:21:15,480 --> 00:21:17,600
tension remained high between 
these two men. 

314
00:21:19,000 --> 00:21:22,280
Later that year, Oceangate 
announced plans to build Cyclops

315
00:21:22,280 --> 00:21:24,640
2 using a carbon fiber pressure 
hall. 

316
00:21:25,680 --> 00:21:28,600
Using carbon fiber for 
submersibles was not a new 

317
00:21:28,600 --> 00:21:31,520
concept. 
The US Navy experimented with a 

318
00:21:31,520 --> 00:21:34,520
carbon fiber pressure hall in 
the 1980s with excellent 

319
00:21:34,520 --> 00:21:37,520
results. 
The project, called the Advanced

320
00:21:37,520 --> 00:21:41,560
Unmanned Search System Vehicle, 
or AUSS, resulted in a 

321
00:21:41,560 --> 00:21:45,520
cylindrical vessel 30 3/4 inches
wide and five and a half feet 

322
00:21:45,520 --> 00:21:48,920
long. 
Test results showed the unmanned

323
00:21:48,920 --> 00:21:51,600
and remotely operated 
submersible could withstand at 

324
00:21:51,600 --> 00:21:56,320
least 100 dives to depths up to 
6100 meters, about 20,000 feet 

325
00:21:56,480 --> 00:22:00,840
before risk of failure. 
In 2012, film director James 

326
00:22:00,840 --> 00:22:04,120
Cameron successfully piloted the
one person Deep Sea Challenger 

327
00:22:04,120 --> 00:22:07,880
submersible to the bottom of the
Mariana Trench, almost 36,000 

328
00:22:07,880 --> 00:22:11,160
feet or 11,000 meters. 
But it's hull was made from a 

329
00:22:11,160 --> 00:22:14,680
composite material called 
syntactic foam, not carbon 

330
00:22:14,680 --> 00:22:18,120
fiber. 
Carbon fiber had never been 

331
00:22:18,120 --> 00:22:21,400
thoroughly tested or certified 
for deep sea submersibles. 

332
00:22:21,600 --> 00:22:25,120
Still, Rush touted the material 
as the future of submersibles. 

333
00:22:25,680 --> 00:22:29,520
He often told the media carbon 
fiber is 3 times better than 

334
00:22:29,520 --> 00:22:31,480
titanium for strength to 
buoyancy. 

335
00:22:32,720 --> 00:22:35,920
Carbon fiber is also resistant 
to corrosion and has excellent 

336
00:22:35,920 --> 00:22:38,240
fatigue tolerance. 
Its strength and lightweight 

337
00:22:38,240 --> 00:22:40,360
characteristics make it a 
popular choice for the 

338
00:22:40,360 --> 00:22:43,000
aerospace, automotive and sports
industries. 

339
00:22:43,840 --> 00:22:46,640
While these are indeed 
advantages, carbon fiber has 

340
00:22:46,640 --> 00:22:50,920
several inherent weaknesses, 
according to Carbon FGA, 

341
00:22:50,920 --> 00:22:53,160
manufacturer of carbon fiber 
products. 

342
00:22:53,480 --> 00:22:56,800
A significant drawback is its 
tendency to shatter when its 

343
00:22:56,800 --> 00:22:59,720
limitations are exceeded, 
leading to irreversible damage 

344
00:22:59,720 --> 00:23:03,400
and potential casualties. 
It is a brittle material with 

345
00:23:03,400 --> 00:23:06,840
low ductility, meaning it is 
highly resistant to flexing and 

346
00:23:06,840 --> 00:23:09,920
stretching. 
This can be problematic under 

347
00:23:09,920 --> 00:23:13,160
high stress, such as the immense
pressure of deep sea 

348
00:23:13,160 --> 00:23:16,360
exploration. 
Rush visited their respected 

349
00:23:16,360 --> 00:23:19,920
firm, Deep Ocean Exploration and
Research Marine Operations in 

350
00:23:19,920 --> 00:23:23,120
Alameda, CA, to learn the 
results of the company's 

351
00:23:23,200 --> 00:23:26,120
project. 
Deep Search President Liz 

352
00:23:26,120 --> 00:23:29,240
Taylor, an engineer herself, 
warned Rush of using the 

353
00:23:29,240 --> 00:23:32,200
untested and unproven carbon 
fiber to build his pressure 

354
00:23:32,200 --> 00:23:36,600
hull, saying with the carbon 
fiber, it's been shown to not be

355
00:23:36,600 --> 00:23:39,840
very happy when it's being 
immersed, first of all, and then

356
00:23:39,840 --> 00:23:42,680
being hollow on the inside or 
just one atmosphere on the 

357
00:23:42,680 --> 00:23:45,640
inside, and then having the 
tremendous pressure of the ocean

358
00:23:45,640 --> 00:23:48,440
trying to push in on it. 
It's not the right material. 

359
00:23:49,320 --> 00:23:53,600
Taylor added another prescient 
warning, saying we all told him 

360
00:23:53,800 --> 00:23:57,000
someone is going to be killed in
this thing and you've got to not

361
00:23:57,000 --> 00:24:00,440
do it. 
Initial design plans for the 

362
00:24:00,440 --> 00:24:03,720
submersibles, hull and systems 
were created in conjunction with

363
00:24:03,720 --> 00:24:06,400
engineers at Boeing and the 
University of Washington's 

364
00:24:06,400 --> 00:24:10,160
Applied Physics Lab. 
However, Boeing engineers were 

365
00:24:10,160 --> 00:24:12,920
not convinced the vessel could 
withstand the pressure of deep 

366
00:24:12,920 --> 00:24:16,600
sea missions and had their 
concerns undeterred. 

367
00:24:16,640 --> 00:24:20,120
Ocean Gate had a one third scale
model of Cyclops 2 built 

368
00:24:20,120 --> 00:24:24,720
entirely out of carbon fiber in 
2015 and tested it in an 8 foot 

369
00:24:24,720 --> 00:24:26,680
testing tank at the Applied 
Physics Lab. 

370
00:24:27,840 --> 00:24:31,120
The scale models carbon fiber 
domes at each end shattered at 

371
00:24:31,120 --> 00:24:33,760
pressures equating to a depth of
3000 meters. 

372
00:24:34,840 --> 00:24:37,680
The Dome end caps were replaced 
with aluminum disks for 

373
00:24:37,680 --> 00:24:41,000
additional testing and remain 
stable up to pressures equating 

374
00:24:41,000 --> 00:24:44,920
to 4100 meters. 
New carbon fiber domes were used

375
00:24:44,920 --> 00:24:48,640
in March of 2016, but these also
failed at a pressure equal to 

376
00:24:48,640 --> 00:24:52,480
3000 meters. 
A fourth test, again using 

377
00:24:52,480 --> 00:24:55,720
aluminum caps instead of carbon 
fiber domes, reached a pressure 

378
00:24:55,720 --> 00:24:59,040
equal to 4500 meters before the 
hull imploded. 

379
00:25:00,040 --> 00:25:03,960
One engineer involved with the 
testing said This scared the 

380
00:25:03,960 --> 00:25:08,640
shit out of everyone. 
Following these tests, Stockton 

381
00:25:08,640 --> 00:25:10,600
Rush wrote to Ocean Gate 
shareholders. 

382
00:25:11,240 --> 00:25:14,480
Over the next months, we will 
analyze the data in detail and 

383
00:25:14,480 --> 00:25:17,440
then run a test with a new 
cylinder through at least 1000 

384
00:25:17,440 --> 00:25:19,280
cycles to confirm its 
durability. 

385
00:25:20,400 --> 00:25:23,800
According to numerous Ocean Gate
employees, these tests were 

386
00:25:23,800 --> 00:25:28,200
never done. 
Engineers often use what is 

387
00:25:28,200 --> 00:25:31,960
called test to destruction to 
gather data and go through many 

388
00:25:31,960 --> 00:25:35,400
iterations of design and testing
until results are satisfactory. 

389
00:25:36,360 --> 00:25:39,600
Oceangate only tested to 
destruction on its scale model 

390
00:25:39,600 --> 00:25:42,560
pressure hull and never 
performed tests of the carbon 

391
00:25:42,560 --> 00:25:45,800
fiber hull with its titanium 
domes, which were included in 

392
00:25:45,800 --> 00:25:49,680
its final design. 
Nevertheless, Stockton Rush went

393
00:25:49,680 --> 00:25:53,000
ahead with construction of the 
full size submersible with a 

394
00:25:53,000 --> 00:25:56,840
requirement to increase the hull
from 4 1/2 inches thick to 5 

395
00:25:56,840 --> 00:26:00,360
inches thick. 
Once again, specifications that 

396
00:26:00,360 --> 00:26:03,920
were not tested. 
It was around this time that 

397
00:26:03,920 --> 00:26:07,280
Ocean Gate decided to part with 
the University of Washington APL

398
00:26:07,280 --> 00:26:10,960
Engineers and create an in house
engineering team and hired Tony 

399
00:26:10,960 --> 00:26:12,640
Neeson as Director of 
Engineering. 

400
00:26:13,680 --> 00:26:17,000
Mr. Neeson was AUS Navy diver 
who then earned a degree in 

401
00:26:17,000 --> 00:26:19,400
Material Science Engineering 
from the University of 

402
00:26:19,400 --> 00:26:22,160
California, Berkeley. 
He had over a decade of 

403
00:26:22,160 --> 00:26:25,960
experience primarily in avionics
and aeronautics prior to being 

404
00:26:25,960 --> 00:26:28,800
hired by Ocean Gate, but had no 
experience working on 

405
00:26:28,800 --> 00:26:33,840
submersibles. 
In January 2017, the contract to

406
00:26:33,840 --> 00:26:37,600
build the full size carbon fiber
pressure hall for Cyclops 2 was 

407
00:26:37,600 --> 00:26:41,280
given dispenser composites. 
Ocean Gate provided challenging 

408
00:26:41,280 --> 00:26:43,600
requirements. 
The hall must be able to 

409
00:26:43,600 --> 00:26:48,480
withstand £6600 per square inch,
correlating to a depth of 4000 

410
00:26:48,480 --> 00:26:52,560
meters or just over 13,000 feet,
and allowed just six weeks to do

411
00:26:52,560 --> 00:26:56,080
it. 
By May of 2017, Ocean Gate began

412
00:26:56,080 --> 00:26:58,920
taking reservations for 
excursions at a cost of 

413
00:26:58,920 --> 00:27:04,760
$105,129. 
Construction was completed at 

414
00:27:04,760 --> 00:27:09,080
the end of 2017. 
The submersible was 22 feet long

415
00:27:09,240 --> 00:27:11,640
and weighed approximately 
£21,000. 

416
00:27:12,360 --> 00:27:15,800
It's 8.1 feet long pressure hull
was made of five inch thick 

417
00:27:15,800 --> 00:27:19,000
carbon fiber and polymer 
composite surrounded by a 

418
00:27:19,000 --> 00:27:22,840
fiberglass outer hull. 
The forward titanium Dome was 

419
00:27:22,840 --> 00:27:26,760
the only entry or exit and 
housed a 53 centimeter diameter 

420
00:27:26,760 --> 00:27:29,320
viewing window made of 6 inch 
thick acrylic. 

421
00:27:30,560 --> 00:27:34,040
The aft titanium Dome was sealed
off from the interior cabin by a

422
00:27:34,040 --> 00:27:36,920
bulkhead and contained the 
vessels control systems. 

423
00:27:38,080 --> 00:27:41,520
Both the forward and aft domes 
use titanium coupling rings to 

424
00:27:41,520 --> 00:27:44,040
attach to the hull. 
The aft portion of the 

425
00:27:44,040 --> 00:27:48,040
submersible was a tail cone 
making for a unique design and 

426
00:27:48,040 --> 00:27:51,520
the entire vehicle was supported
by a metal frame including a 

427
00:27:51,520 --> 00:27:55,800
landing frame below. 
Inside of the submersible was an

428
00:27:55,800 --> 00:27:59,400
oxygen tank for the cabin plus 
four additional emergency tanks.

429
00:28:00,040 --> 00:28:03,440
The pilot sat in the aft section
of the cabin and used 2 monitors

430
00:28:03,520 --> 00:28:06,560
for viewing the external pilot, 
camera communications and 

431
00:28:06,560 --> 00:28:09,440
monitoring the sonar. 
The vehicle itself was 

432
00:28:09,440 --> 00:28:11,920
controlled by an off the shelf 
game controller. 

433
00:29:14,720 --> 00:29:17,360
The viewport window in the 
forward titanium Dome was 

434
00:29:17,360 --> 00:29:22,280
constructed by Hydrospace Group.
Its CEO, Will Conan expected 

435
00:29:22,280 --> 00:29:24,960
Ocean Gate to follow the testing
standards outlined by the 

436
00:29:24,960 --> 00:29:27,240
American Society of Mechanical 
Engineers. 

437
00:29:27,880 --> 00:29:31,120
Those standards, according to 
Conan, would require Ocean Gate 

438
00:29:31,120 --> 00:29:34,640
to test at least 5 viewport 
windows to destruction at high 

439
00:29:34,640 --> 00:29:38,600
pressure, cycle a viewport from 
low to high pressure 1000 times,

440
00:29:38,720 --> 00:29:42,200
and subject another viewport to 
five times the intended pressure

441
00:29:42,240 --> 00:29:46,120
for 300 consecutive hours to see
how much the plastic reacted 

442
00:29:46,120 --> 00:29:49,000
under pressure. 
But those tests were not 

443
00:29:49,000 --> 00:29:53,440
conducted by Ocean Gate over a 
period of years, added Conan. 

444
00:29:53,720 --> 00:29:56,720
It was pretty obvious that Ocean
Gate wasn't going to do the 

445
00:29:56,720 --> 00:29:59,880
testing. 
Concerned, Conan offered to 

446
00:29:59,880 --> 00:30:03,320
manufacture a viewport for Ocean
Gate that was already tested and

447
00:30:03,320 --> 00:30:07,000
rated for 4000 meters, and 
offered a significant discount 

448
00:30:07,000 --> 00:30:10,200
to do so. 
Stockton Rush flatly declined. 

449
00:30:10,720 --> 00:30:13,480
The original design for the 
viewport was delivered by Hydra 

450
00:30:13,480 --> 00:30:17,600
Group as ordered, but Conan only
rated it up to 650 meters. 

451
00:30:18,360 --> 00:30:21,320
Rush insisted that the vessel 
have space for five people, 

452
00:30:21,480 --> 00:30:24,960
which would include the pilot, 
an expert guide and three paying

453
00:30:24,960 --> 00:30:29,200
customers telling an audience at
a Geek Wire Summit you don't do 

454
00:30:29,200 --> 00:30:31,720
the coolest thing you're ever 
going to do in your life by 

455
00:30:31,720 --> 00:30:34,800
yourself. 
You take your wife, your son, 

456
00:30:35,000 --> 00:30:38,480
your daughter, your best friend.
There have to be 4 people 

457
00:30:38,480 --> 00:30:42,520
besides the pilot. 
Ocean Gate Director of Marine 

458
00:30:42,520 --> 00:30:46,080
Operations and Submersible pilot
David Lockridge conducted A 

459
00:30:46,080 --> 00:30:48,520
thorough quality control 
inspection of the finished 

460
00:30:48,520 --> 00:30:53,640
submersible in January of 2018. 
His written report documented 27

461
00:30:53,640 --> 00:30:56,800
issues with the vehicle, 
including faulty O-ring seals on

462
00:30:56,800 --> 00:31:01,240
the titanium domes, missing 
bolts, flammable materials, and 

463
00:31:01,240 --> 00:31:03,160
concerns about its carbon fiber 
hull. 

464
00:31:03,880 --> 00:31:07,080
Lockridge was concerned that the
hull had never been tested to 

465
00:31:07,080 --> 00:31:10,160
destruction and that he would 
not allow any manned test dives 

466
00:31:10,160 --> 00:31:14,800
until a hull scan was completed.
On January 19th, an extremely 

467
00:31:14,800 --> 00:31:17,520
contentious meeting took place 
at Ocean Gate Headquarters 

468
00:31:17,520 --> 00:31:19,760
regarding the inspection 
performed by Lockridge. 

469
00:31:20,320 --> 00:31:23,040
You heard a small portion of 
that recorded meeting at the top

470
00:31:23,040 --> 00:31:25,840
of this episode in which 
Lockridge insisted on having the

471
00:31:25,840 --> 00:31:28,640
hull scanned. 
There is a clear rift between 

472
00:31:28,640 --> 00:31:32,240
Rush and Lockridge, but Bonnie 
Carl and Scott Griffith shared 

473
00:31:32,240 --> 00:31:35,240
their concerns as well and 
criticized Director of 

474
00:31:35,240 --> 00:31:38,520
Engineering Tony Neeson for his 
lack of communication and 

475
00:31:38,520 --> 00:31:40,280
unwillingness to share 
information. 

476
00:31:41,560 --> 00:31:45,000
I'm uncomfortable with you doing
the man test as well, and I've 

477
00:31:45,280 --> 00:31:48,280
the thought of going down to the
Bahamas and bringing back a dead

478
00:31:48,280 --> 00:31:53,480
body would mentally everyone who
is down there and that's gets 

479
00:31:53,480 --> 00:31:56,080
the show. 
I'm coming at this from my 

480
00:31:56,080 --> 00:31:57,880
accounting background as an 
auditor, right? 

481
00:31:58,360 --> 00:32:02,560
And I can have a client tell me 
his books are perfect. 

482
00:32:02,560 --> 00:32:05,440
I don't I don't trust him right.
I mean, I may trust him as a 

483
00:32:05,440 --> 00:32:07,680
person. 
It's trust verifying, right? 

484
00:32:08,120 --> 00:32:11,920
And I, I feel a little bit like 
we're getting some pushback on 

485
00:32:11,920 --> 00:32:14,800
the verification piece. 
It's a trust me, trust me, trust

486
00:32:14,800 --> 00:32:19,400
me and and that's difficult. 
We're jumping ahead and we're. 

487
00:32:19,400 --> 00:32:21,440
Just making a lot of assumptions
and. 

488
00:32:21,960 --> 00:32:25,760
And that's why it's so critical 
through this development process

489
00:32:25,760 --> 00:32:31,280
that we collect accurate data. 
We have performance reports from

490
00:32:31,280 --> 00:32:34,440
engineering. 
We take that quantitative data 

491
00:32:34,520 --> 00:32:38,360
and move forward. 
My frustration partially comes 

492
00:32:38,400 --> 00:32:43,560
from trying to get additional 
knowledge from Tony. 

493
00:32:43,840 --> 00:32:47,600
He puts up walls. 
He stops you. 

494
00:32:48,440 --> 00:32:51,080
I want to know this stuff. 
And granted, he's, you know, 

495
00:32:51,080 --> 00:32:53,960
willing to teach me about strain
gauges and that's great, but I 

496
00:32:54,000 --> 00:32:57,680
feel like everything else is, 
trust me, I'm an engineer and 

497
00:32:57,680 --> 00:33:01,560
you don't need to see that. 
So do I That's frustrating. 

498
00:33:01,560 --> 00:33:04,480
This group should be the most 
open group. 

499
00:33:04,480 --> 00:33:07,440
We should be talking with each 
other constantly. 

500
00:33:07,600 --> 00:33:10,800
Pilots, engineers, operations, 
we should all be on the same 

501
00:33:10,800 --> 00:33:13,000
page. 
And it's an US against them. 

502
00:33:13,000 --> 00:33:15,320
And that, that's great. 
That's going to kill this 

503
00:33:15,320 --> 00:33:19,080
company. 
Neeson didn't say much during 

504
00:33:19,080 --> 00:33:22,400
this meeting, nor was he present
for the entire meeting, but what

505
00:33:22,400 --> 00:33:25,760
he did say comes across as 
defensive and adversarial with 

506
00:33:25,760 --> 00:33:28,120
Lockridge. 
All I'm asking for is 

507
00:33:28,200 --> 00:33:29,720
information here. 
OK? 

508
00:33:29,880 --> 00:33:32,120
And I'm for information. 
I've got it now. 

509
00:33:32,400 --> 00:33:34,560
We don't have information. 
No, we do. 

510
00:33:34,560 --> 00:33:37,040
Hold on. 
No, we have all the information 

511
00:33:37,040 --> 00:33:38,000
we need, right. 
OK. 

512
00:33:38,240 --> 00:33:40,560
No, no, no, no, no, no. 
You can't dismiss that. 

513
00:33:41,120 --> 00:33:43,720
I have to dismiss it because 
I've asked to see it. 

514
00:33:43,960 --> 00:33:48,800
You don't have to see it, Tony. 
Shortly after this meeting, 

515
00:33:48,960 --> 00:33:52,040
Stockton Rush fired David 
Lockridge, who was given 10 

516
00:33:52,040 --> 00:33:53,640
minutes to collect his 
belongings. 

517
00:33:54,440 --> 00:33:57,400
David Lockridge went on to file 
a whistleblower complaint with 

518
00:33:57,400 --> 00:34:00,720
the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration, or OSHA. 

519
00:34:01,600 --> 00:34:04,840
Ocean Gate then filed A lawsuit 
against Lockridge for sharing 

520
00:34:04,840 --> 00:34:08,000
proprietary information, 
prompting A countersuit by 

521
00:34:08,000 --> 00:34:09,719
Lockridge for wrongful 
termination. 

522
00:34:10,840 --> 00:34:14,639
These cases were settled out of 
court in November 2018, and 

523
00:34:14,639 --> 00:34:16,880
Lockridge withdrew his complaint
with OSHA. 

524
00:34:18,400 --> 00:34:21,239
With the most experienced 
submersible pilot at Ocean Gate 

525
00:34:21,239 --> 00:34:24,679
now out of the picture, Stockton
Rush announced that Bonnie Carl 

526
00:34:24,679 --> 00:34:27,000
would take over as the company's
submersible pilot. 

527
00:34:27,920 --> 00:34:31,400
Carl, an accountant, had no 
experience whatsoever in 

528
00:34:31,400 --> 00:34:34,800
piloting or engineering. 
She was shocked, to say the 

529
00:34:34,800 --> 00:34:37,840
least, and not interested, and 
soon left the company. 

530
00:34:39,280 --> 00:34:42,400
Marine Technology Society, an 
organization that promotes 

531
00:34:42,400 --> 00:34:45,800
marine technology, was alarmed 
by the apparent turbocharged 

532
00:34:45,800 --> 00:34:48,960
development and lack of proper 
testing going on at Ocean Gate. 

533
00:34:49,960 --> 00:34:53,520
Will Conan of the aforementioned
Hydra Group was the chairman of 

534
00:34:53,520 --> 00:34:57,200
the group's Manned Submersible 
Committee and in March of 2018 

535
00:34:57,200 --> 00:34:59,320
drafted a letter to Rush 
writing. 

536
00:34:59,920 --> 00:35:03,000
Our apprehension is that the 
current experimental approach 

537
00:35:03,000 --> 00:35:06,360
adopted by Ocean Gate could 
result in negative outcomes from

538
00:35:06,360 --> 00:35:09,560
minor to catastrophic, that 
would have serious consequences 

539
00:35:09,560 --> 00:35:14,200
for everyone in the industry. 30
other industry experts sign 

540
00:35:14,200 --> 00:35:17,640
their names to this letter. 
Ultimately, it was never sent, 

541
00:35:17,840 --> 00:35:21,480
but according to Conan, he and 
Rush had a quote frank 

542
00:35:21,480 --> 00:35:24,560
conversation. 
It was an adult conversation and

543
00:35:24,560 --> 00:35:29,640
we agreed to disagree. 
In March of 2018, the Cyclops 2 

544
00:35:29,640 --> 00:35:34,280
was officially renamed to Titan.
Ocean Gate reported that Titan 

545
00:35:34,280 --> 00:35:37,320
was being developed and 
assembled in Washington, but 

546
00:35:37,320 --> 00:35:40,320
would be owned by a Bahamian 
entity, will be registered in 

547
00:35:40,320 --> 00:35:43,640
the Bahamas, and will operate 
exclusively outside the 

548
00:35:43,640 --> 00:35:45,680
territorial waters of the United
States. 

549
00:35:46,680 --> 00:35:49,680
However, it was learned that 
only the company, Ocean Gate 

550
00:35:49,680 --> 00:35:52,400
Expeditions Limited, was 
registered in the Bahamas. 

551
00:35:53,160 --> 00:35:56,200
Regarding Ocean Gate, the 
Bahamian government later told 

552
00:35:56,200 --> 00:35:59,440
the Chicago Tribune its 
submersible Titan and its 

553
00:35:59,440 --> 00:36:02,640
support vessel associated with 
the recent tragedy are not 

554
00:36:02,640 --> 00:36:06,000
registered under the Bahamas 
flag and are therefore beyond 

555
00:36:06,000 --> 00:36:09,280
the jurisdiction and purview of 
the design, construction and 

556
00:36:09,280 --> 00:36:12,400
operational regulatory standards
which would be applicable to 

557
00:36:12,400 --> 00:36:16,480
Bahamian flag vessels. 
Matt McCoy, Ocean Gate 

558
00:36:16,480 --> 00:36:19,760
operations director at the time,
recalled Russia's statements 

559
00:36:19,760 --> 00:36:22,880
about registering the vehicle. 
He said that they were going to 

560
00:36:22,880 --> 00:36:25,960
flag the Titan in the Bahamas 
and launch out of Canada so they

561
00:36:25,960 --> 00:36:27,840
wouldn't fall under US 
jurisdiction. 

562
00:36:28,120 --> 00:36:30,800
But if the Coast Guard became a 
problem, he would buy himself a 

563
00:36:30,800 --> 00:36:34,880
congressman and make it go away.
After that, I resigned from the 

564
00:36:34,880 --> 00:36:38,720
company. 
In fact, Titan was never 

565
00:36:38,720 --> 00:36:42,720
registered in any country. 
This means it didn't fly any 

566
00:36:42,720 --> 00:36:45,240
national flag or have a port of 
registry. 

567
00:36:45,840 --> 00:36:49,400
It had no official number or 
formal documentation as a vessel

568
00:36:49,400 --> 00:36:51,480
under any country's maritime 
registry. 

569
00:36:52,000 --> 00:36:55,880
It was what is called stateless 
and was not operating under the 

570
00:36:55,880 --> 00:36:59,560
jurisdiction of any authority. 
As far as official records were 

571
00:36:59,560 --> 00:37:04,640
concerned, Titan didn't exist. 
A number of industry experts, 

572
00:37:04,640 --> 00:37:07,920
including Will Conan, David 
Lockridge and Rob McCallum from 

573
00:37:07,920 --> 00:37:11,160
within Ocean Gate, had urged 
Stockton Rush to have the Titan 

574
00:37:11,160 --> 00:37:14,000
classed. 
A classed vessel has been 

575
00:37:14,000 --> 00:37:17,880
inspected and certified by a 
third party organization such as

576
00:37:17,880 --> 00:37:23,000
the American Bureau of Shipping,
Det Norska Veritas or DNV, or 

577
00:37:23,000 --> 00:37:25,840
Lloyd's Registry. 
Virtually all commercial 

578
00:37:25,840 --> 00:37:28,480
vessels, including submersibles,
are classed. 

579
00:37:29,200 --> 00:37:32,920
Rush did look into getting 
classed by DNV but balked at the

580
00:37:32,920 --> 00:37:36,240
$50,000 fee and withdrew his 
application. 

581
00:37:37,160 --> 00:37:39,880
Rush claimed Titan was so 
innovative that it would take 

582
00:37:39,880 --> 00:37:44,120
years to get classed. 
In a 2019 blog post on Ocean 

583
00:37:44,120 --> 00:37:48,320
Gate's website, the company 
wrote bringing an outside entity

584
00:37:48,320 --> 00:37:51,880
up to speed on every innovation 
before it is put into real world

585
00:37:51,880 --> 00:37:54,760
testing is anathema to rapid 
innovation. 

586
00:37:55,480 --> 00:37:58,520
In a later e-mail to Ocean Gate 
consultant Rob McCallum, 

587
00:37:58,840 --> 00:38:02,760
Stockton Rush wrote Titan and 
its safety systems are way 

588
00:38:02,760 --> 00:38:04,560
beyond anything currently in 
use. 

589
00:38:04,960 --> 00:38:07,920
I've grown tired of industry 
players who try to use safety 

590
00:38:07,920 --> 00:38:11,240
arguments to stop innovation and
new entrants from entering their

591
00:38:11,240 --> 00:38:14,920
small existing market. 
Since starting Ocean Gate, we 

592
00:38:14,920 --> 00:38:18,160
have heard the baseless cries of
you are going to kill someone 

593
00:38:18,160 --> 00:38:21,720
way too often. 
McCallum cut ties with Ocean 

594
00:38:21,720 --> 00:38:58,080
Gate shortly after. 
David Negley of Boeing, who 

595
00:38:58,080 --> 00:39:01,920
assisted with early carbon fiber
hull designs, sent his analysis 

596
00:39:01,920 --> 00:39:04,520
of the hull manufactured by 
Spencer Composites. 

597
00:39:05,040 --> 00:39:09,480
In his analysis, Negley warned, 
We think you are at high risk of

598
00:39:09,480 --> 00:39:13,320
a significant failure at or 
before you reach 4000 meters. 

599
00:39:13,720 --> 00:39:16,080
We do not think you have any 
safety margin. 

600
00:39:16,520 --> 00:39:20,560
Be cautious and careful. 
Rush placed a lot of his faith 

601
00:39:20,560 --> 00:39:23,680
and confidence in the acoustic 
monitoring system to gauge the 

602
00:39:23,680 --> 00:39:25,840
health of the carbon fiber 
composite hall. 

603
00:39:26,520 --> 00:39:30,040
Designed by outside contractor 
Alan Green, this system was 

604
00:39:30,040 --> 00:39:32,840
essentially a series of 
microphones that carefully 

605
00:39:32,840 --> 00:39:35,720
monitored the sounds coming from
the carbon fibers in the hall. 

606
00:39:36,640 --> 00:39:39,320
Rush explained that this system 
could detect the sound of, 

607
00:39:39,320 --> 00:39:42,600
quote, micro buckling in the 
hall way before it fails. 

608
00:39:43,280 --> 00:39:46,720
When Alan Green heard this 
explanation by Rush, he became 

609
00:39:46,720 --> 00:39:49,200
concerned and wrote an e-mail to
Oceangate. 

610
00:39:50,160 --> 00:39:53,120
Green explained that the sounds 
coming from the hull indicate 

611
00:39:53,320 --> 00:39:55,280
irreversible damage. 
Writing. 

612
00:39:55,800 --> 00:39:59,280
It is my belief, substantiated 
by many years of experience, 

613
00:39:59,560 --> 00:40:02,440
that composite structures all 
have a finite lifetime. 

614
00:40:02,680 --> 00:40:05,760
While I do not intend to be an 
alarmist, I did not sleep well 

615
00:40:06,040 --> 00:40:10,840
and arose early to send this 
message despite all of the 

616
00:40:10,840 --> 00:40:14,120
warnings from industry experts, 
even from within Ocean Gate. 

617
00:40:14,640 --> 00:40:17,360
Stockton Rush was focused on 
taking paying customers on 

618
00:40:17,360 --> 00:40:20,600
expeditions scheduled to begin 
in June of 2018. 

619
00:40:21,560 --> 00:40:24,720
Preliminary shallow water tests 
were performed in Puget Sound 

620
00:40:24,720 --> 00:40:28,840
and in April of 2018, Titan was 
transported to Marsh Harbor in 

621
00:40:28,840 --> 00:40:30,560
the Bahamas for deep water 
testing. 

622
00:40:31,560 --> 00:40:34,520
On May 8th, Titan was launched 
from its Launch and Recovery 

623
00:40:34,520 --> 00:40:38,640
System platform, or the Lars and
dived to a depth of 6 meters. 

624
00:40:39,160 --> 00:40:42,280
Three days later, Rush took the 
sub down himself to a depth of 

625
00:40:42,280 --> 00:40:46,120
35 meters, after which 15 
problems were included in 

626
00:40:46,120 --> 00:40:49,520
Titan's maintenance log, 
including its aft fairing being 

627
00:40:49,520 --> 00:40:53,160
ripped off while being towed, 
communications failures, drop 

628
00:40:53,160 --> 00:40:56,800
weight failures at both depth 
and at the surface, and water 

629
00:40:56,800 --> 00:40:58,360
ingress to the starboard 
thruster. 

630
00:40:58,640 --> 00:41:01,880
Oceangate announced its 
scheduled 2018 expeditions to 

631
00:41:01,880 --> 00:41:06,000
the Titanic were postponed until
2019, citing complications due 

632
00:41:06,000 --> 00:41:08,840
to bad weather, but that Titan 
would continue with tests 

633
00:41:08,840 --> 00:41:12,400
throughout the year. 
A series of uncrewed dives took 

634
00:41:12,400 --> 00:41:16,360
place between June 21st and June
26th, and Titan reached a depth 

635
00:41:16,360 --> 00:41:21,000
of 4000 meters. 11 crude dives 
took place in the Bahamas over 

636
00:41:21,000 --> 00:41:25,320
the coming months, reaching a 
maximum depth of 2487 meters. 

637
00:41:26,240 --> 00:41:29,920
In December of 2018, Rush 
piloted the Titan on a solo 

638
00:41:29,920 --> 00:41:34,920
mission to 3939 meters and 
became just the second person 

639
00:41:35,160 --> 00:41:38,120
after filmmaker James Cameron to
reach such depths. 

640
00:41:39,000 --> 00:41:43,400
Its acoustic monitoring system 
measured 153 total incidents per

641
00:41:43,400 --> 00:41:46,760
sensor during the dive, 
including many loud concerning 

642
00:41:46,760 --> 00:41:49,240
pops. 
Director of Engineering Tony 

643
00:41:49,240 --> 00:41:52,920
Neeson was alarmed, saying those
pops mean the hull is breaking. 

644
00:41:53,960 --> 00:41:57,280
Still following this dive, Ocean
Gate released the following 

645
00:41:57,280 --> 00:41:59,920
statement. 
Not only did this dive 

646
00:41:59,920 --> 00:42:03,040
completely validate Ocean Gates,
innovative engineering, and the 

647
00:42:03,040 --> 00:42:06,400
construction of Titan's carbon 
fiber and titanium hull, but it 

648
00:42:06,400 --> 00:42:10,280
also means systems are a go for 
the 2019 Titanic Survey 

649
00:42:10,280 --> 00:42:13,880
Expedition, the world's deepest 
adventure scheduled to begin 

650
00:42:13,880 --> 00:42:17,000
next summer, Tony Neeson wrote 
to his team. 

651
00:42:17,520 --> 00:42:19,920
Diving to such depths is 
extremely complicated. 

652
00:42:19,920 --> 00:42:23,240
If you want to be untethered, 
communicate with the surface, be

653
00:42:23,240 --> 00:42:26,800
location tracked with reasonable
accuracy, and monitor the health

654
00:42:26,800 --> 00:42:29,480
of your vehicle, and we have 
delivered. 

655
00:42:30,000 --> 00:42:31,600
You all have a lot to brag 
about. 

656
00:42:33,320 --> 00:42:37,400
Another deep water test dive was
conducted on April 17th, 2019. 

657
00:42:37,800 --> 00:42:41,440
On board were pilot Stockton 
Rush, Joel Perry, President of 

658
00:42:41,440 --> 00:42:45,280
Ocean Gate Expeditions, Carl 
Stanley, owner of the Roatan 

659
00:42:45,280 --> 00:42:48,200
Institute of Deep Sea 
Exploration and an experienced 

660
00:42:48,200 --> 00:42:52,240
submersible operator, and Petros
Matthiodicus, a field technician

661
00:42:52,240 --> 00:42:55,840
for 2G Robotics participating in
the dive to test equipment. 

662
00:42:56,560 --> 00:43:01,800
Titan reached 3760 meters, but 
again, many loud pops and 

663
00:43:01,800 --> 00:43:04,720
cracking sounds were heard on 
board and recorded by the 

664
00:43:04,720 --> 00:43:09,120
acoustic monitoring system. 
Following the dive, Carl Stanley

665
00:43:09,120 --> 00:43:12,600
warned Rush of Titan's potential
failure, writing in a letter. 

666
00:43:13,160 --> 00:43:16,400
The acoustic signatures we 
observed yesterday do not appear

667
00:43:16,400 --> 00:43:19,400
to correspond with typical 
failure modes such as random 

668
00:43:19,400 --> 00:43:22,040
fiber breakage. 
The sounds we heard seemed 

669
00:43:22,040 --> 00:43:25,800
indicative of a localized flaw 
or defect in the hole structure 

670
00:43:25,800 --> 00:43:29,440
being subjected to significant 
external pressures resulting in 

671
00:43:29,440 --> 00:43:32,560
crushing or damage. 
The intensity and persistence of

672
00:43:32,560 --> 00:43:36,480
the sounds, particularly their 
continuation at depth, point to 

673
00:43:36,480 --> 00:43:39,320
the possibility of a specific 
area of the hole material 

674
00:43:39,320 --> 00:43:42,680
experience progressive 
degradation or becoming spongy. 

675
00:43:43,400 --> 00:43:45,800
The only question in mind is 
whether it will fail 

676
00:43:45,800 --> 00:43:50,360
catastrophically or not. 
Stanley described the sounds as 

677
00:43:50,360 --> 00:43:53,600
having a sharp percussive 
quality resembling the sounds of

678
00:43:53,600 --> 00:43:55,440
gunshots coming from Titans 
Hall. 

679
00:43:56,040 --> 00:43:58,360
Multiple other problems were 
encountered on the dive, 

680
00:43:58,720 --> 00:44:01,600
including thrusters 
malfunctioning, battery issues, 

681
00:44:01,800 --> 00:44:05,640
and the exterior lights failing.
Stanley later admitted that he 

682
00:44:05,640 --> 00:44:08,760
had no idea of the terrible 
danger he was in at the time. 

683
00:44:10,720 --> 00:44:13,320
Ocean Gate engineers determined 
the pressure from these deep 

684
00:44:13,320 --> 00:44:16,560
water test dives had compressed 
Titans Hall far greater than 

685
00:44:16,560 --> 00:44:20,240
what was intended or expected. 
Tony Neeson expressed his 

686
00:44:20,240 --> 00:44:22,840
concerns, pointing to 
potentially critical structural 

687
00:44:22,840 --> 00:44:26,040
issues. 
Nevertheless, Rush asked Neeson 

688
00:44:26,040 --> 00:44:29,000
to sign off on the planned 
upcoming Titanic expeditions, 

689
00:44:29,400 --> 00:44:32,840
but Neeson refused, stressing 
that Titan's Hall was still an 

690
00:44:32,840 --> 00:44:36,000
untested prototype with no 
established safety standards or 

691
00:44:36,000 --> 00:44:38,560
benchmarks to operate as a 
viable man submersible. 

692
00:44:39,680 --> 00:44:42,520
More test dives were scheduled 
to further assess Titan's hull 

693
00:44:42,520 --> 00:44:45,680
integrity. 
In May of 2019, during a pre 

694
00:44:45,680 --> 00:44:49,280
dive inspection, a significant 
crack in the carbon fiber hall 

695
00:44:49,280 --> 00:44:52,880
was found, measuring 4 feet in 
length and resulting in 11 

696
00:44:52,880 --> 00:44:55,240
square feet of carbon fiber 
delaminating. 

697
00:44:55,520 --> 00:44:57,760
In other words, the layers had 
separated. 

698
00:44:58,520 --> 00:45:01,320
After further inspection back at
Ocean Gates facilities in 

699
00:45:01,320 --> 00:45:05,000
Everett, WA, Stockton Rush 
ordered his engineers to grind 

700
00:45:05,000 --> 00:45:08,960
down the crack to determine its 
depth, repair it, reassemble the

701
00:45:08,960 --> 00:45:11,200
sub in three weeks, and then 
dive it again. 

702
00:45:11,800 --> 00:45:15,400
Rush wanted Tony Neeson to pilot
Titan on the upcoming Titanic 

703
00:45:15,400 --> 00:45:18,320
missions. 
The once confident defender of 

704
00:45:18,320 --> 00:45:22,400
Rush and Titan objected, saying 
he would not go down in the sub.

705
00:45:23,400 --> 00:45:26,600
Ocean Gate Chief Operating 
Officer Robert Schumann released

706
00:45:26,600 --> 00:45:30,720
a statement on June 5th, 2019 
announcing Titanic expeditions 

707
00:45:30,720 --> 00:45:34,120
for 20/19 were once again 
postponed due to legal 

708
00:45:34,120 --> 00:45:37,400
complications with its support 
vessel Avila Harmony. 

709
00:45:38,280 --> 00:45:41,360
While there were legal issues 
resulting in Avila Harmony 

710
00:45:41,360 --> 00:45:44,320
withdrawing from the project, 
the real reason for the 

711
00:45:44,320 --> 00:45:46,480
postponement was Titan's damaged
hull. 

712
00:45:46,920 --> 00:45:50,000
The crack in the hull was never 
mentioned and employees were 

713
00:45:50,000 --> 00:45:54,120
told to keep it quiet. 
In July, Stockton Rush fired 

714
00:45:54,120 --> 00:45:57,640
Director of Engineering Tony 
Neeson, claiming 2 people on 

715
00:45:57,640 --> 00:46:00,880
Ocean Gates Board of directors 
said Neeson should have known 

716
00:46:00,880 --> 00:46:04,800
the hull would fail, telling 
Neeson either you go or I go and

717
00:46:05,000 --> 00:46:08,880
it's not going to be me. 
Tony Neeson later said that he 

718
00:46:08,880 --> 00:46:11,920
did know it would fail and did 
inform Stockton Rush in a 

719
00:46:11,920 --> 00:46:15,200
report. 
In a further cost cutting 

720
00:46:15,200 --> 00:46:18,320
measure, additional engineering 
staff were let go in the coming 

721
00:46:18,320 --> 00:46:20,880
months and the overall 
engineering team was trimmed 

722
00:46:20,880 --> 00:46:23,040
down to roughly half of its 
original number. 

723
00:46:23,760 --> 00:46:26,560
Many of the engineers who 
remained were recent university 

724
00:46:26,560 --> 00:46:28,400
graduates and were 
inexperienced. 

725
00:46:29,520 --> 00:46:32,560
Rush was insisted on getting 
Titan back into operation to 

726
00:46:32,560 --> 00:46:34,440
maintain credibility with the 
public. 

727
00:46:35,040 --> 00:46:38,800
In the summer of 2019, Stockton 
Rush deemed the sub operational 

728
00:46:38,800 --> 00:46:43,760
again, but at shallower depths 
prior to a test night dive. 

729
00:46:43,760 --> 00:46:47,600
An incident on August 7th, 2019 
was close to catastrophic. 

730
00:46:48,200 --> 00:46:51,200
During a steep descent, 
equipment inside of Titan 

731
00:46:51,200 --> 00:46:54,520
shifted due to the newly ground 
down interior of the hull. 

732
00:46:55,040 --> 00:46:58,080
The high pressure airlines were 
stretched as a result, nearly 

733
00:46:58,080 --> 00:47:02,200
resulting in an explosion inside
the vessel. 2 months later, in 

734
00:47:02,200 --> 00:47:05,240
October, the cracked Titan hull 
was sent to the Deep Ocean 

735
00:47:05,240 --> 00:47:10,000
Testing Facility in Bethesda, MD
for pressure tests over 5 days 

736
00:47:10,080 --> 00:47:14,080
and at a cost of $60,200. 
Tests revealed the hull could 

737
00:47:14,080 --> 00:47:17,840
only be rated for a depth of 
3000 meters, not deep enough for

738
00:47:17,840 --> 00:47:21,520
Titanic Expeditions. 
Ocean Gate then announced it 

739
00:47:21,520 --> 00:47:25,040
would be building 2 new 
submersibles, Cyclops 3 and 

740
00:47:25,040 --> 00:47:29,200
Cyclops 4, designed to reach 
depths up to 6000 meters. 

741
00:47:30,400 --> 00:47:33,480
That's going to do it for Part 1
of the Ocean Gate Titan 

742
00:47:33,480 --> 00:47:35,520
submersible. 
A preventable tragedy. 

743
00:47:35,920 --> 00:47:41,280
Part 2 will be coming soon. 
Shipwrecks and Sea Dogs as 

744
00:47:41,280 --> 00:47:44,080
written, edited and produced by 
me, Rich Napolitano. 

745
00:47:44,640 --> 00:47:46,640
Original theme music is by Sean 
Siegfried. 

746
00:47:47,320 --> 00:47:49,320
For AD free listening, please 
subscribe at 

747
00:47:49,320 --> 00:47:53,480
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748
00:47:53,480 --> 00:47:57,760
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749
00:47:57,760 --> 00:48:00,400
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750
00:48:00,960 --> 00:48:03,920
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751
00:48:04,880 --> 00:48:07,840
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752
00:48:07,840 --> 00:48:12,240
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753
00:48:12,240 --> 00:48:15,120
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754
00:48:16,080 --> 00:48:18,600
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755
00:48:18,600 --> 00:48:21,920
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756
00:48:21,920 --> 00:48:25,600
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Please join me again next time. 

757
00:48:26,360 --> 00:48:31,880
And as always, don't forget to 
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