The OceanGate Titan Submersible: A Preventable Tragedy - Part 2

The following is an excerpt from

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the testimony of Carl Stanley, 
owner of the Roatan Institute of

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Deep Sea Exploration and an 
experienced submersible 

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operator, at a hearing before 
the US Coast Guard's Marine 

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Board of Investigation in 2023. 
When we went out, it was 

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Stockton myself, sonar 
technician for a third party 

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supplier I believe. 
And he, his duty was something 

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like calibrating the sonar. 
And then it was a friend of 

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Stockton from childhood who was,
I believe the COO on the 

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company. 
And he told us to be prepared 

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for noises. 
And he had recently done the 

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solo dive on his own and 
basically just said, you know, 

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this is going to make noise and,
and brace yourselves. 

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So there were four of us in 
there. 

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And in in retrospect, there were
a lot of red flags that now 

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after the implosion and learning
more and putting different 

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pieces of the puzzle together 
start making sense and our kind 

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of clues, we could have easily 
gone in a little deeper and that

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would have been a better test. 
But I think that was an 

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indication of his lack of faith 
in that that vessel. 

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And when we got down there, he 
didn't do any of the driving in 

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my recollection. 
He immediately, I believe I was 

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the first one to drive, but he 
basically insisted it was his 

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idea. 
Nobody asked to drive, had each 

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of us drive. 
And I think that was his kind of

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sick way of if we had imploded, 
we were a little bit in control 

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of our own destiny. 
Because when we were driving, we

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were needing to go towards 
deeper water to I mean, the idea

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was really we were trying to get
to the exact depth of the 

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Titanic to confirm the hull was 
safe for that depth. 

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You know, he knew at that point 
what the cross section of the 

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hull look like. 
He knew that his engineer had 

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quit that would refuse to go in 
it, that the lockridge was 

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refusing. 
You know, I didn't know any of 

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these things. 
So we got down there and it's 

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making noises that, you know, 
the sound of a carbon fiber band

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breaking when it's in a 5 inch 
matrix is a lot of energy being 

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released. 
And we were all clearly a little

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disnerved, but he had warned us 
and the cracking sounds would 

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amplify when you got deeper. 
And at some point, I don't 

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remember who we were all like, 
well, that's probably close 

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enough. 
We've been down here long enough

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and we went back up and what I 
wrote him in the emails and 

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which is even more concerning 
than the cracking sounds that 

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happened on the way down or 
while we were at the bottom, is 

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that there was a kind of like a 
grand finale of cracking sounds 

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as we were getting close to the 
surface. 

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Which I'm not a carbon fiber 
expert, but just thinking about 

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it logically, the only way that 
you get a whole lot of more 

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cracking when you're coming back
up is that material degraded so 

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much that it stored energy that 
was then released as the 

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pressure was released. 
And you know, that's what I 

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wrote him in the e-mail. 
I realize what I'm going to say 

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kind of is I expect objections 
from Ocean Gates Council and I 

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would wish that you would 
indulge me a few minutes to lay 

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out what I think about this, 
seeing that Ocean Gate came 

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very, very close to killing me 
and has had a severe impact on 

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my business as well as an entire
industry. 

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The definition of an accident is
something that happened 

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unexpectedly and by sure chance 
there was nothing unexpected 

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about this. 
This was expected by everybody 

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that had access to a little bit 
of information. 

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And I think that if it wasn't an
accident, it then has to be some

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some degree of crime. 
And if it's a crime, I think to 

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truly understand it, you need to
understand the criminal's 

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motive. 
And I think the entire reason 

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this whole operation started was
Stockton had a desire to leave 

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his mark on history. 
He had he was living in the 

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shadow of 250 years of 
historically significant 

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figures. 
He knew that eventually it was 

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going to end like this and he 
wasn't going to be held 

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accountable, but he was going to
be the most famous of all his 

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famous relatives. 
Part 2 and the conclusion of the

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Ocean Gate Titan submersible. 
A preventable tragedy today on 

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shipwrecks and sea dogs. 
Hello and welcome to Shipwrecks 

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and Sea Dogs, tales of mishaps, 
misfortune, and misadventure. 

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I'm your host, Rich Napolitano. 
This is Part 2 and the 

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conclusion of the Ocean Gate 
Titan submersible, A preventable

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tragedy In Part 1 of this 
series. 

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You heard of Stockton Rush's 
background, the creation of 

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Ocean Gate, and the early 
development of the Titan 

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submersible. 
You also heard numerous examples

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of Ocean Gate ignoring numerous 
warnings from industry experts 

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and from Ocean Gate's Director 
of Marine Operations, David 

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Lockridge. 
When we left off, a crack in 

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Titans hull had recently been 
discovered and the sub could no 

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longer dive deep enough to reach
the Titanic. 

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Ocean Gate needed a new carbon 
fiber pressure hull, further 

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delaying the launch of its 
Titanic expeditions. 

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Ocean Gate continued expeditions
using the now D rated Titan at 

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shallower depths, as well as 
their other submersibles 

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including Antipodes and Cyclops.
1A new carbon fiber hull was 

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needed to rebuild Titan, and the
company made an agreement with 

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NASA to design, build and test a
one third scale model carbon 

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fiber hull. 
However, due to the COVID-19 

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pandemic in 2020, NASA 
facilities were shut down for 

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many months. 
Ultimately, NASA engineers only 

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served in an advisory role, 
providing remote consultation 

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and guidance about carbon fiber 
composite. 

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Oceangate subsequently turned to
two firms to build its scale 

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model, Electro Impact, which 
laid the carbon fibers, and 

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Janaki Industries, which cured 
the material in its ovens. 

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The scale model was delivered to
Ocean Gate in May of 2020 and 

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was tested at the University of 
Washington Applied Physics Lab. 

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The carbon fiber scale model 
hull imploded at pressure equal 

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to 3000 meters in what was 
described as a quote 

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catastrophic failure. 
Electro impact recommended a 

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process called multi curing, 
which would fix the problems of 

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having wrinkles in the fiber. 
This required laying a few 

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inches of the carbon material at
a time, then sending the hull to

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cure, then repeating this 
process until the entire hull 

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was completed. 
Stockton Rush refused this 

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process, citing increased cost. 
No further tests were conducted 

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on scale models and Rush moved 
forward with construction of the

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full-sized hull. 
This decision did not sit well 

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with what remained of Ocean 
Gate's engineers. 

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Project manager and submersible 
pilot Emily Hammermeister said 

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she would not bolt anyone into 
the sub. 

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She resigned from Motion Gate in
September of 2020, citing a lack

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of safety protocols. 
Electro Impact began 

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manufacturing the full-sized 
hall for Titan in the winter of 

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2020. 
In February of 2021, the 

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original titanium domes and 
coupling rings from the first 

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version of Titan were sent to 
Electro Impact and attached to 

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the new hall. 
Rush firmly objected to 

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manufacturing new titanium domes
and coupling rings, once again 

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due to cost. 
The entire hall, with its 

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titanium domes included, were 
transported to the Deep Ocean 

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Testing Facility in Maryland, 
where it reached a maximum 

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pressure equating to 4200 
meters. 

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Between April 29th and May 25th,
2021, Ocean Gate conducted a 

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total of 11 test dives in Puget 
Sound, with the deepest dive 

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reaching a depth of 170 meters. 
Maintenance logs from these 

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dives resulted in 57 issues that
required corrective action. 

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The new Titan hall was based on 
a scale model design that did 

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not withstand pressures at 
Titanic depth. 

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The rebuilt Titan was never 
tested in actual deep water 

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conditions before being put into
service for the Titanic missions

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with people on board, including 
paying customers. 

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After several years of delays, 
and with Ocean Gate desperately 

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needing revenue, Titan was put 
on a truck for St. 

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John's, NL, its departure point 
for its first Titanic 

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expedition. 
Stockton Rush would pilot this 

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mission himself, with Mission 
Specialist paying $125,000 per 

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person. 
On June 30th, 2021, the first 

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Titanic dive was attempted, but 
it aborted after reaching just 7

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meters due to an electronics 
failure. 

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After being towed back to the 
support vessel, it's £3000 

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titanium forward Dome sheared 
off while the sub was being 

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pulled up onto a ramp. 
It was determined that because 

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of the pitching and rolling of 
the ship and the angle of the 

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ramp, a force was exerted on the
Dome of Titan, causing it to 

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snap the four bolts that 
attached the Dome to the hull. 

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The Dome was intended to use 18 
bolts to attach to the coupling 

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ring, but Stockton Rush had 
previously decided to use only 

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four bolts so it would be 
quicker to get the crew in and 

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out of the sub. 
He reasoned that once underwater

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and under pressure, the domes 
would be firmly in place and did

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not need 18 bolts. 
Following this incident, all 18 

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bolts were used to hold the 
forward Dome in place. 

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The 2021 expedition continued 
over the next month and on July 

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9th during dive #63, Titan 
reached a depth of 3840 meters 

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Titanic depth. 
On board was famed French deep 

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sea explorer and Titanic expert 
Paul Henri Nargile, who will go 

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on many dives aboard Titan. 
Over three years, Titan skirted 

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in and out around the debris 
field of the Titanic wreck. 

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However, a problem arose when 
its drop weights failed to 

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release when attempting to 
ascend. 

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These are external weights that 
when dropped, allow the vessel 

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to return to the surface. 
After troubleshooting the 

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problems, the crew was able to 
rewire the electronics to 

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release enough weight for Titan 
to resurface. 

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In later testimony, Ocean Gate 
Director of Logistics and 

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Quality Assurance Scott 
Griffith, who was also the 

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copilot during this dive, told 
the US Coast Guard Marine Board 

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of Investigation that he quote 
heard what I thought was what 

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Stockton had described as the 
sound of the carbon fiber 

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cracking as a slap of the ruler 
on the table. 

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And I heard a sound related to 
that on one dive at depth. 

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But that was the only one, one 
incident of that. 

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Despite the problems, Ocean Gate
issued a press release on July 

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13th, 2021 announcing they had 
made the 3800 meter dive to the 

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Titanic wreck site. 
Included in the release was a 

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statement from Stockton Rush 
Reading. 

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00:13:12,720 --> 00:13:16,040
We had to overcome tremendous 
engineering, operational, 

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business and finally COVID-19 
challenges to get here, and I am

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so proud of this team and 
grateful for the support of our 

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many partners. 
Stockton Rush often touted ocean

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00:13:26,680 --> 00:13:30,080
gates, partnerships with Boeing,
NASA and the University of 

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00:13:30,080 --> 00:13:34,840
Washington Applied Physics Lab. 
This was a vast overstatement at

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00:13:34,840 --> 00:13:37,280
best. 
Apparently to bolster Ocean 

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Gates reputation and attract 
customers to pay hundreds of 

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thousands of dollars to reserve 
a dive on Titan in 2020, NASA 

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provided advisory support and 
technical consultation on 

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composite materials and 
manufacturing processes related 

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00:13:50,520 --> 00:13:54,080
to carbon fiber construction. 
No design, construction, 

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engineering, or testing was done
by NASA engineers, and NASA 

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00:13:57,680 --> 00:13:59,840
facilities were never used by 
Ocean Gate. 

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00:14:01,160 --> 00:14:04,640
Boeing engineers assisted with 
early designs for a carbon fiber

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00:14:04,640 --> 00:14:08,160
hull, but they warned Rush of 
potential catastrophic problems 

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00:14:08,160 --> 00:14:11,080
with using the material in the 
high pressure environment of 

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00:14:11,080 --> 00:14:15,280
deep ocean exploration. 
Boeing has made it clear that it

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00:14:15,280 --> 00:14:18,720
was not a partner on the Titan 
submersible and did not design, 

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engineer or build the sub. 
The University of Washington 

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Applied Physics Lab only 
collaborated with Ocean Gate on 

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initial designs, and Ocean Gate 
contracted for the use of AP LS 

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pressure testing Lab. 
UW engineers did not analyze or 

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00:14:33,480 --> 00:14:35,520
verify any results from that 
testing. 

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00:14:36,480 --> 00:14:40,000
The University of Washington has
publicly stated, despite early 

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marketing claims by Oceangate, 
the APL was not involved in the 

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00:14:43,640 --> 00:14:46,640
Titan project in that its 
earlier work was entirely 

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separate from the deep ocean 
Titan development. 

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I'm almost always writing, 
researching, recording or 

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00:14:53,880 --> 00:14:57,280
editing, so having a healthy and
delicious meal that's super easy

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00:14:57,280 --> 00:14:59,760
to prepare makes my life so much
simpler. 

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00:15:00,200 --> 00:15:03,600
Factor makes healthy eating 
easy, especially during these 

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00:15:03,600 --> 00:15:06,920
cold winter months with fully 
prepared meals designed by 

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00:15:06,920 --> 00:15:11,360
dietitians and crafted by chefs 
so eat well without the planning

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00:15:11,360 --> 00:15:13,880
or cooking. 
Factor meals are packed with 

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00:15:13,880 --> 00:15:16,800
high quality whole food 
ingredients and balanced with 

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00:15:16,800 --> 00:15:20,080
lean proteins and veggies. 
My favorite is the blackened 

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shrimp in Cajun gravy served 
over brown rice with colorful 

240
00:15:23,480 --> 00:15:26,480
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241
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is active. 
Dive number 65 took place on 

260
00:16:33,200 --> 00:16:36,640
July 19th with Stockton Rush 
again piloting the vessel. 

261
00:16:37,720 --> 00:16:41,200
Also on board were a copilot, a 
researcher from the University 

262
00:16:41,200 --> 00:16:43,680
of Rhode Island, and two mission
specialists. 

263
00:16:44,800 --> 00:16:48,440
Titan reached a depth of 3500 
meters, but again experienced a 

264
00:16:48,440 --> 00:16:52,280
problem with the drop weights. 
Rush attempted to use Titan's 

265
00:16:52,280 --> 00:16:55,120
thrusters to return to the 
surface, but this very quickly 

266
00:16:55,120 --> 00:16:58,160
depleted the vessel's battery 
power at 3300 meters. 

267
00:16:59,280 --> 00:17:02,520
Their situation was communicated
to the support team above on 

268
00:17:02,520 --> 00:17:05,880
board the vessel Horizon Arctic 
via a text based chat system. 

269
00:17:07,200 --> 00:17:10,200
Rush inquired about the 
temperature at Titanic depth as 

270
00:17:10,200 --> 00:17:14,200
he was considering returning to 
the bottom and waiting 24 hours 

271
00:17:14,240 --> 00:17:17,880
until the emergency squibs would
automatically release the drop 

272
00:17:17,880 --> 00:17:21,440
weights on the surface. 
Mission director Kyle Bingham 

273
00:17:21,440 --> 00:17:24,680
instructed Rush to release the 
entire drop weight tray, which 

274
00:17:24,680 --> 00:17:26,520
would then allow Titan to 
resurface. 

275
00:17:27,319 --> 00:17:30,240
Rush did not want to do this as 
it would mean Titan would be 

276
00:17:30,240 --> 00:17:32,880
unable to make any further dives
on this expedition. 

277
00:17:33,480 --> 00:17:36,760
He wanted to wait 24 hours at 
the bottom of the sea until the 

278
00:17:36,760 --> 00:17:40,800
squibs released the weights. 
Bingham was later told by 

279
00:17:40,800 --> 00:17:44,920
another crew member on the sub 
quote Stockton went around to 

280
00:17:44,920 --> 00:17:48,560
each passenger or mission 
specialist and he said are you 

281
00:17:48,560 --> 00:17:50,680
willing to stay down here for 24
hours? 

282
00:17:51,080 --> 00:17:53,960
Because if you don't the 
company's going out of business.

283
00:17:54,440 --> 00:17:56,440
So he pressured those people to 
say yes. 

284
00:17:56,800 --> 00:17:59,920
The only person who from my 
understanding said no was the 

285
00:17:59,920 --> 00:18:04,680
copilot and he basically texted 
up to us saying I'm done, call 

286
00:18:04,680 --> 00:18:08,040
my wife, tell her get me a plane
ticket because when I get back 

287
00:18:08,040 --> 00:18:12,120
up I'm quitting. 
For the next 3 1/2 hours, 

288
00:18:12,120 --> 00:18:14,680
Titan's crew worked on a 
solution while they descended to

289
00:18:14,680 --> 00:18:16,880
the bottom. 
And ultimately we're able to 

290
00:18:16,880 --> 00:18:19,880
manipulate the hydraulic pump 
for the drop weight tray just 

291
00:18:19,880 --> 00:18:22,840
enough to release a portion of 
the weights and tighten 

292
00:18:22,840 --> 00:18:25,440
resurfaced without sacrificing 
the entire tray. 

293
00:18:27,120 --> 00:18:30,120
After returning to St. 
John's, the copilot, whose name 

294
00:18:30,120 --> 00:18:33,480
was redacted in official 
reports, departed the expedition

295
00:18:33,760 --> 00:18:38,760
and did not take part in any 
future dive missions. 11 dives 

296
00:18:38,760 --> 00:18:42,520
were made during the 2021 
Titanic Expedition, with six of 

297
00:18:42,520 --> 00:18:47,040
them reaching Titanic depth. 72 
maintenance issues were logged 

298
00:18:47,080 --> 00:18:50,400
and six incident reports were 
recorded, including the forward 

299
00:18:50,400 --> 00:18:54,640
Dome falling off, 2 instances of
drop weight failures, a valve 

300
00:18:54,640 --> 00:18:57,320
set in the wrong position, and 
an electrical fire. 

301
00:18:57,880 --> 00:19:00,960
Nevertheless, this was a huge 
success for Ocean Gate and the 

302
00:19:00,960 --> 00:19:03,800
company received much praise and
positive media attention. 

303
00:19:04,680 --> 00:19:08,240
Ocean Gate then announced its 
2022 expedition and urged 

304
00:19:08,240 --> 00:19:10,920
aspiring mission specialists to 
contact Ocean Gate. 

305
00:19:12,640 --> 00:19:15,560
Rather than return Titan to 
Ocean Gate headquarters in 

306
00:19:15,560 --> 00:19:19,720
Everett, WA, Rush chose to take 
the sub on a 7 month publicity 

307
00:19:19,720 --> 00:19:22,760
tour. 
Titan made stops at educational 

308
00:19:22,760 --> 00:19:26,160
institutions, country clubs, and
adventure clubs, including the 

309
00:19:26,160 --> 00:19:29,120
University of Rhode Island and 
the Princeton Club in Lake 

310
00:19:29,120 --> 00:19:32,480
Forest, IL. 
This did not sit well with 

311
00:19:32,480 --> 00:19:35,760
Director of Engineering Dan 
Scoville, who later testified 

312
00:19:36,560 --> 00:19:38,680
they were going to bring the sub
back in March. 

313
00:19:38,760 --> 00:19:42,120
And we're going to have April, 
May, and we're going to be gone 

314
00:19:42,120 --> 00:19:44,840
by June. 
So that gives us 8 weeks to fix 

315
00:19:44,840 --> 00:19:47,440
the sub instead of the nine 
months that we should probably 

316
00:19:47,440 --> 00:19:50,160
have. 
Scoville was then fired as 

317
00:19:50,160 --> 00:19:53,760
director of engineering in the 
fall of 2021 and replaced by 

318
00:19:53,760 --> 00:19:56,720
Phil Brooks, who had been a 
software engineer at Ocean Gate.

319
00:19:57,960 --> 00:20:01,680
In the spring of 2021, 
Expedition Discovery host Josh 

320
00:20:01,680 --> 00:20:04,880
Gates visited Ocean Gate in 
Everett to film an episode about

321
00:20:04,880 --> 00:20:08,640
the Titan submersible during a 
shallow test dive in Puget 

322
00:20:08,640 --> 00:20:10,560
Sound. 
The sub was plagued with 

323
00:20:10,560 --> 00:20:13,240
problems with just about 
everything, causing the dive to 

324
00:20:13,240 --> 00:20:16,560
be cut short. 
Upon reaching the surface, Gates

325
00:20:16,560 --> 00:20:18,920
informed the president of the 
network that he was canceling 

326
00:20:18,920 --> 00:20:22,960
the episode, adding this is a 
mistake, something bad is going 

327
00:20:22,960 --> 00:20:27,960
to happen here. 
The 2022 Titanic expedition 

328
00:20:27,960 --> 00:20:31,440
season began on June 16th, once 
again departing from St. 

329
00:20:31,440 --> 00:20:35,080
John's, NL and using the Horizon
Arctic as its support vessel. 

330
00:20:35,840 --> 00:20:38,680
CBS News correspondent David 
Pogue was on board the 

331
00:20:38,680 --> 00:20:41,720
expedition to do a story about 
Ocean Gate and the Titan sub. 

332
00:20:42,520 --> 00:20:46,200
He and ACBS producer intended to
reach the Titanic wreck, but the

333
00:20:46,200 --> 00:20:48,880
dive was scrubbed after reaching
just 37 feet. 

334
00:20:49,760 --> 00:20:52,520
Ultimately, Pogue's story 
included details of his 

335
00:20:52,520 --> 00:20:55,240
experience, describe the 
features of Titan's equipment 

336
00:20:55,640 --> 00:20:57,360
and an interview with Stockton 
Rush. 

337
00:20:57,840 --> 00:21:00,200
But he did not get to see the 
wreck of the Titanic. 

338
00:21:00,880 --> 00:21:04,000
Stockton Rush ultimately was not
happy with what CBS had 

339
00:21:04,000 --> 00:21:06,920
produced, believing it cast 
Ocean Gate in a poor light. 

340
00:21:08,320 --> 00:21:12,040
The 2022 expedition experienced 
ups and downs, including damage 

341
00:21:12,040 --> 00:21:15,600
to the sub, team members, 
contracting COVID-19, bad 

342
00:21:15,600 --> 00:21:17,960
weather, and some fairly 
distressing moments. 

343
00:21:19,120 --> 00:21:23,440
On July 15th, 2022, Titan 
embarked on dive #80 with Scott 

344
00:21:23,440 --> 00:21:27,760
Griffith as pilot, pH Narjulay 
as the content expert, and three

345
00:21:27,760 --> 00:21:29,440
paying mission specialists on 
board. 

346
00:21:30,560 --> 00:21:33,480
While exploring the Titanic 
wreckage, the sub became 

347
00:21:33,480 --> 00:21:37,480
entangled in Titanic's Grand 
Staircase, Alfred Hagen, one of 

348
00:21:37,480 --> 00:21:40,440
the mission specialists on Dive 
80, later testified. 

349
00:21:41,240 --> 00:21:44,080
We kind of descended a little 
bit into the grand staircase 

350
00:21:44,080 --> 00:21:47,680
because the skylight was gone. 
And so we, we saw all the normal

351
00:21:47,680 --> 00:21:52,720
iconic sites and I wanted to 
investigate the area of the 

352
00:21:52,720 --> 00:21:57,200
rupture and, and I asked pH to 
go back. 

353
00:21:57,200 --> 00:21:59,160
And of course there's a lot of 
currents swirling around. 

354
00:21:59,160 --> 00:22:03,840
And, and when we briefly got 
stuck and it was just like pipes

355
00:22:03,840 --> 00:22:06,440
and things and, and pH very 
quickly. 

356
00:22:07,760 --> 00:22:10,280
I, I, I, when I say stuck, we 
weren't stuck. 

357
00:22:11,000 --> 00:22:12,960
I doubt if it was more than a 
minute or two. 

358
00:22:12,960 --> 00:22:17,360
And we and I and I, we, we were 
definitely stuck, yeah. 

359
00:22:18,320 --> 00:22:21,520
And. 
Just to clarify, that Titan was 

360
00:22:21,600 --> 00:22:23,640
entangled with the wreckage of 
the Titanic. 

361
00:22:24,000 --> 00:22:28,560
Would that be accurate? 
Yes, well, we were ascending and

362
00:22:28,560 --> 00:22:31,320
I, I, I, I don't recall the 
depth. 

363
00:22:31,320 --> 00:22:34,800
I think we were fairly close to 
the surface, but we, we water 

364
00:22:34,800 --> 00:22:40,080
and there was a, you know, just 
a, a, a large bang or cracking 

365
00:22:40,080 --> 00:22:42,640
sound. 
And of course, you know, Sonic 

366
00:22:42,640 --> 00:22:46,080
events in, in a submersible or, 
or alarming. 

367
00:22:46,080 --> 00:22:49,640
So we were all concerned that 
you maybe there was a crack in 

368
00:22:49,640 --> 00:22:52,840
the hole. 
A post dive evaluation on Titan 

369
00:22:52,840 --> 00:22:55,800
took place and it was determined
that the vessel had shifted 

370
00:22:55,800 --> 00:22:58,440
within its metal frame, causing 
the loud bang. 

371
00:22:59,480 --> 00:23:03,120
This evaluation did not include 
removing the insert to visually 

372
00:23:03,120 --> 00:23:06,560
examine its integrity. 
At a debriefing meeting the 

373
00:23:06,560 --> 00:23:09,840
following morning, a mission 
specialist expressed concern 

374
00:23:09,840 --> 00:23:11,840
over the loud bang that she 
heard on the sub. 

375
00:23:12,800 --> 00:23:16,000
According to Ocean gate 
contractor Antonella Wilby, a 

376
00:23:16,000 --> 00:23:18,640
robotics engineer and 
experienced submersible pilot 

377
00:23:19,160 --> 00:23:23,080
Stockton Rush brushed this 
concern aside in her testimony 

378
00:23:23,080 --> 00:23:25,920
to the Marine Board of 
Investigation will be stated 

379
00:23:25,920 --> 00:23:29,840
that Rush quote just sort of I 
felt brushed it aside. 

380
00:23:30,160 --> 00:23:33,200
He said it was probably just the
sled banging against the frame 

381
00:23:33,400 --> 00:23:36,640
and then Oh well, deep sea 
vehicles just make lots of noise

382
00:23:36,640 --> 00:23:40,960
due to pressure changes will be 
brought her concerns to Director

383
00:23:40,960 --> 00:23:45,320
of Administration Amber Bay, who
told will be yes, many people 

384
00:23:45,320 --> 00:23:47,640
are concerned about you. 
You don't seem to have an 

385
00:23:47,640 --> 00:23:51,040
explorer mindset, adding that 
will be had a quote bad 

386
00:23:51,040 --> 00:23:54,240
attitude. 
Willby then spoke to Director of

387
00:23:54,240 --> 00:23:57,480
Engineering Phil Brooks, who 
explained that Titans Hall only 

388
00:23:57,480 --> 00:24:01,000
shifted a few microns and that 
the expedition would continue as

389
00:24:01,000 --> 00:24:04,120
planned. 
Amber BAE offered to send Will 

390
00:24:04,120 --> 00:24:07,200
be home and will be resigned 
from her contractor position at 

391
00:24:07,200 --> 00:24:09,120
Ocean Gate and left the 
following day. 

392
00:24:11,280 --> 00:24:14,520
Dive 81 took place a few days 
later on July 19th. 

393
00:24:15,400 --> 00:24:18,480
During this dive, pilot Scott 
Griffith was heard to say 

394
00:24:18,880 --> 00:24:20,480
there's something wrong with my 
thruster. 

395
00:24:21,400 --> 00:24:24,280
Titan's thrusters had been 
mounted improperly, with one 

396
00:24:24,280 --> 00:24:26,960
pointing in the wrong direction,
causing the vessel to go in 

397
00:24:26,960 --> 00:24:29,320
circles. 
Griffith was forced to take 

398
00:24:29,320 --> 00:24:32,040
Titan to the bottom and wait 
while Stockton Rush came up with

399
00:24:32,040 --> 00:24:35,880
a solution on the support 
vessel, passenger Renetta Rojas 

400
00:24:35,880 --> 00:24:39,480
later told the BBC. 
I was thinking we're not going 

401
00:24:39,480 --> 00:24:42,880
to make it. 
Hours later, Griffith was told 

402
00:24:42,880 --> 00:24:45,840
to turn the off the shelf 
wireless game controller upside 

403
00:24:45,840 --> 00:24:48,280
down and operate the controls in
reverse. 

404
00:24:49,080 --> 00:24:54,440
Griffith did this and Titan was 
able to return to the surface. 7

405
00:24:54,440 --> 00:24:58,560
of 13 dives during the 2022 
expedition reached Titanic depth

406
00:24:58,640 --> 00:25:01,160
and Ocean Gate succeeded in 
giving some of its mission 

407
00:25:01,160 --> 00:25:03,520
specialists excellent views of 
the Titanic. 

408
00:25:04,320 --> 00:25:08,200
However, the acoustic monitoring
of the hull recorded 120 

409
00:25:08,200 --> 00:25:11,760
incidents per sensor, and the 
maintenance log documented 48 

410
00:25:11,760 --> 00:25:13,520
maintenance issues and two 
incidents. 

411
00:25:14,600 --> 00:25:17,880
Some of these were minor, but 
every acoustic event recorded 

412
00:25:17,880 --> 00:25:20,040
translates into a carbon fiber 
breaking. 

413
00:25:21,080 --> 00:25:24,760
Unlike in 2021, the Titan 
submersible and its associated 

414
00:25:24,760 --> 00:25:28,160
equipment were not shipped back 
to Everett, WA for the winter. 

415
00:25:29,120 --> 00:25:31,960
Instead, it was left in St. 
John's, NL. 

416
00:25:32,640 --> 00:25:38,160
From July 26th, 2022 until 
February 6th, 2023, the Titan 

417
00:25:38,160 --> 00:25:42,080
submersible was stored outdoors 
in a parking lot at a seaside 

418
00:25:42,080 --> 00:25:45,440
facility. 
It was completely unprotected 

419
00:25:45,440 --> 00:25:47,400
from the elements during the 
Canadian winter. 

420
00:25:48,160 --> 00:25:51,080
Director of Engineering Phil 
Brooks was frustrated by this 

421
00:25:51,080 --> 00:25:53,960
decision. 
The cost of shipping it back 

422
00:25:54,400 --> 00:25:57,240
was, was prohibitive. 
They were low on money. 

423
00:25:58,240 --> 00:26:01,360
And so, you know, we couldn't do
that. 

424
00:26:01,440 --> 00:26:04,760
And really that was that was 
basically around the time that I

425
00:26:04,760 --> 00:26:08,120
left, you know, that that it 
gotten quite frustrated with 

426
00:26:08,120 --> 00:26:11,680
some of these issues and had had
decided to leave the company. 

427
00:26:12,280 --> 00:26:16,040
So to confirm, Stockton was 
aware of the concerns of this 

428
00:26:16,040 --> 00:26:18,520
loud bang. 
Oh yeah, yeah. 

429
00:26:18,520 --> 00:26:22,360
Oh yeah, absolutely. 
In an interview with Netflix, 

430
00:26:22,360 --> 00:26:26,080
former director of engineering 
Tony Neeson said, I told 

431
00:26:26,080 --> 00:26:29,440
Stockton, don't do that. 
Once we build this, it cannot be

432
00:26:29,440 --> 00:26:32,400
stored in sub zero. 
It cannot go freezing. 

433
00:26:33,000 --> 00:26:35,480
If water gets in there and you 
sit it out in freezing 

434
00:26:35,480 --> 00:26:38,560
conditions and that water 
expands, it breaks fibers. 

435
00:26:39,080 --> 00:26:42,800
With 100% certainty, that sub 
could not go freezing. 

436
00:26:44,320 --> 00:26:47,640
During its time stored outdoors 
in Saint John's, the Titan sub 

437
00:26:47,640 --> 00:26:54,360
experienced a high of 29°C and a
low of -17° in Fahrenheit, that 

438
00:26:54,360 --> 00:26:59,960
is 84° and 1.4°, respectively. 
Titan was exposed to freezing 

439
00:26:59,960 --> 00:27:03,680
temperatures for the majority of
November, December and January 

440
00:27:03,760 --> 00:27:07,120
before being moved indoors to 
the Marine Institute at Memorial

441
00:27:07,120 --> 00:27:12,320
University of Newfoundland. 
As the 2023 Titanic expedition 

442
00:27:12,320 --> 00:27:15,680
season approached, Ocean Gate 
received an influx of money from

443
00:27:15,680 --> 00:27:20,240
investors, with the largest 
chunk, $1.85 million, coming 

444
00:27:20,240 --> 00:27:24,160
from Stockton Rush himself. 
At the same time, Ocean Gate 

445
00:27:24,160 --> 00:27:27,280
employees were asked to delay 
their salaries to a future time,

446
00:27:28,200 --> 00:27:30,840
former Director of Engineering 
Phil Brooks stated. 

447
00:27:32,040 --> 00:27:38,400
There were economic issues with 
the company asking us to forgo 

448
00:27:38,400 --> 00:27:42,600
getting paid for periods of time
with the promise that they would

449
00:27:42,600 --> 00:27:45,920
get us caught up in paychecks 
after the first of the year. 

450
00:27:46,800 --> 00:27:50,080
They, they asked for volunteers 
and I don't think anybody did 

451
00:27:50,080 --> 00:27:53,280
it, but, you know, it was, it 
was clear that the company was 

452
00:27:53,320 --> 00:27:59,160
economically very stressed and 
as a result that they weren't 

453
00:27:59,160 --> 00:28:03,480
making decisions and doing 
things that resulted in, I, I 

454
00:28:03,480 --> 00:28:06,760
felt that, that the safety was 
just being compromised too, way 

455
00:28:06,760 --> 00:28:10,280
too much. 
I, I just did not think, it just

456
00:28:10,280 --> 00:28:12,960
did not feel right, you know, 
for them to be going. 

457
00:28:13,400 --> 00:28:17,000
And like I said, I had suggested
that they not go and they, I was

458
00:28:17,000 --> 00:28:19,760
told that that wasn't possible, 
that, you know, they had people 

459
00:28:19,760 --> 00:28:23,680
that paid and that they had to 
go through with it. 

460
00:28:23,680 --> 00:28:25,640
So that was the reason that I 
left. 

461
00:28:26,800 --> 00:28:30,800
On May 12th, Ocean Gates 2023 
expedition season got underway. 

462
00:28:31,600 --> 00:28:33,880
The support vessel used the 
prior two years. 

463
00:28:33,880 --> 00:28:35,800
The Horizon Arctic was 
unavailable. 

464
00:28:36,360 --> 00:28:39,600
The company instead hired the 
Polar Prince, a former Canadian 

465
00:28:39,600 --> 00:28:42,520
Coast Guard icebreaker that had 
been converted into a research 

466
00:28:42,520 --> 00:28:45,600
vessel after being retired from 
service in 1986. 

467
00:28:46,520 --> 00:28:49,720
The Polar Prince had less deck 
space than Horizon Arctic and 

468
00:28:49,720 --> 00:28:53,120
Ocean Gate was forced to make 
design changes to the Lars or 

469
00:28:53,120 --> 00:28:56,200
its launch and recovery system 
so it and Titan could be towed 

470
00:28:56,200 --> 00:28:58,760
behind instead of being 
transported on the deck. 

471
00:28:59,480 --> 00:29:02,320
On May 24th, while on route to 
the Titanic from St. 

472
00:29:02,320 --> 00:29:05,560
John's, the rough seas and large
waves caused significant 

473
00:29:05,560 --> 00:29:08,560
problems. 
Editor in Chief of Travel 

474
00:29:08,560 --> 00:29:11,800
Weekly, Arnie Weissman was 
taking part in the mission and 

475
00:29:11,800 --> 00:29:15,960
described what he saw when the 
seas were most active and fog 

476
00:29:15,960 --> 00:29:18,560
was the thickest. 
A near disaster for the sub and 

477
00:29:18,560 --> 00:29:21,840
platform occurred at the end of 
the rope that linked the stern 

478
00:29:21,840 --> 00:29:24,760
of the ship to the platform. 
We saw that the front of the 

479
00:29:24,760 --> 00:29:26,760
platform and the sub were 
underwater. 

480
00:29:27,920 --> 00:29:30,640
As Ocean Gate crew and divers 
worked on the platform, 

481
00:29:31,000 --> 00:29:34,320
Weissmann spoke directly with 
Stockton Rush, saying. 

482
00:29:34,800 --> 00:29:37,480
When I asked him how much 
jeopardy the sub was in, he 

483
00:29:37,480 --> 00:29:41,000
joked, So a sub is underwater, 
Why is that a problem? 

484
00:29:42,520 --> 00:29:44,800
The following day, Polar Prince 
returned to St. 

485
00:29:44,800 --> 00:29:47,640
John's with the Lars and Titan 
in tow, where a damage 

486
00:29:47,640 --> 00:29:51,360
assessment took place. 
Stockton Rush told expedition 

487
00:29:51,360 --> 00:29:54,400
members that there were some 
concerns about communications 

488
00:29:54,400 --> 00:29:56,280
and an adapter, but that's about
it. 

489
00:29:58,200 --> 00:30:02,160
We're leaving today and entering
a world of Mickey Mouse waving, 

490
00:30:02,400 --> 00:30:07,240
Princess meeting and greetings, 
lightsaber clashing, the toilet 

491
00:30:07,240 --> 00:30:12,600
zone, Tower of terror dropping, 
Banshee flying, Space mountain 

492
00:30:12,600 --> 00:30:16,600
launching, Galaxy rewinding. 
What is the wonderful Galaxy 

493
00:30:16,680 --> 00:30:20,160
rewinding? 
Fireworks igniting world of 

494
00:30:20,280 --> 00:30:22,280
other worlds for whatever you 
love. 

495
00:30:22,680 --> 00:30:26,000
Infinite worlds await at the 
most magical place on Earth, 

496
00:30:26,280 --> 00:30:30,080
Walt Disney World Resort. 
With the weather still causing 

497
00:30:30,080 --> 00:30:32,600
problems, Rush was determined to
get a dive in. 

498
00:30:33,240 --> 00:30:37,720
Dives 8586 and 87 took place off
the Grand Banks of Newfoundland,

499
00:30:37,920 --> 00:30:42,040
which were all aborted at the 
conclusion of Dive 87. 

500
00:30:42,200 --> 00:30:45,640
Problems with the large platform
caused a delay, resulting in 

501
00:30:45,640 --> 00:30:49,160
Titan's bow to repeatedly be 
lifted by swells and slammed 

502
00:30:49,160 --> 00:30:52,160
back down. 
Mission specialists described it

503
00:30:52,160 --> 00:30:55,480
as very jarring. 
They added Stockton Rush was 

504
00:30:55,480 --> 00:30:59,720
antsy and clearly frustrated and
recalled him saying I'm going to

505
00:30:59,720 --> 00:31:01,800
get a dive in even if it kills 
me. 

506
00:31:03,120 --> 00:31:05,480
During a debriefing the 
following day, mission 

507
00:31:05,480 --> 00:31:08,000
specialists pressed their 
concerns about the hall taking a

508
00:31:08,000 --> 00:31:10,120
beating on the water during the 
aborted dive. 

509
00:31:11,000 --> 00:31:14,120
Rush replied by saying the hall 
is practically indestructible, 

510
00:31:14,280 --> 00:31:17,240
completely safe, and that he had
no concerns whatsoever. 

511
00:31:18,720 --> 00:31:21,040
Multiple witnesses later told 
the Marine Board of 

512
00:31:21,040 --> 00:31:24,600
Investigation that no incident 
report was logged about this and

513
00:31:24,600 --> 00:31:28,040
no post dive inspection was done
on Titan or the Lars. 

514
00:31:29,000 --> 00:31:32,280
The Coast Guard was unable to 
locate any records regarding 

515
00:31:32,280 --> 00:31:37,000
Dive 87. 
On June 16th, the Polar Prince 

516
00:31:37,000 --> 00:31:39,280
departed St. 
John's, towing the Lars and 

517
00:31:39,280 --> 00:31:42,880
Titan 370 nautical miles to the 
Titanic wreck site. 

518
00:31:43,960 --> 00:31:47,560
On June 18th, Titan prepared for
its final fateful voyage. 

519
00:31:48,920 --> 00:31:52,760
On board were Stockton Rush, who
operated the sub content expert 

520
00:31:52,760 --> 00:31:56,600
Paul Henri Narjalay and three 
paying passengers, British 

521
00:31:56,600 --> 00:31:59,840
adventurer Hamish Harding, 
British Pakistani billionaire 

522
00:31:59,840 --> 00:32:04,400
Shahzada Dawood and his son, 19 
year old Suleiman Dawood. 

523
00:32:06,000 --> 00:32:09,880
At 9:14 AM Titan was disengaged 
from the Lars and began its 

524
00:32:09,880 --> 00:32:12,240
dive. 
It was normal for Titan to 

525
00:32:12,240 --> 00:32:15,040
maneuver in shallow water to 
test communications prior to 

526
00:32:15,040 --> 00:32:18,000
descending, but Rush did not 
perform this test. 

527
00:32:18,000 --> 00:32:22,840
On this dive, Wendy Rush, 
Stockton's wife and Ocean Gates 

528
00:32:22,840 --> 00:32:25,840
Director of Communications, was 
on board the Polar Prints 

529
00:32:25,840 --> 00:32:28,840
monitoring communications from 
Titan and its location. 

530
00:32:30,160 --> 00:32:34,360
At 9:43 AM, communication via 
its text based messaging system 

531
00:32:34,360 --> 00:32:37,400
was lost. 
Multiple messages were sent from

532
00:32:37,400 --> 00:32:42,520
Polar Prints and finally at 10 O
8:00 AM, the message K was 

533
00:32:42,520 --> 00:32:45,760
received from Titan indicating a
communications check. 

534
00:32:47,000 --> 00:32:52,960
At 10:47 AM, Titan had reached 
3341 meters and reported it had 

535
00:32:52,960 --> 00:32:55,560
dropped two of its ballast 
weights to slow its descent. 

536
00:32:55,840 --> 00:33:00,280
Normal procedure. 6 seconds 
later, an automated message was 

537
00:33:00,280 --> 00:33:05,720
sent by Titan, recording its 
position and depth of 3346.28 

538
00:33:05,720 --> 00:33:10,440
meters. 2 seconds after 
receiving this message, a loud 

539
00:33:10,440 --> 00:33:13,800
low rumbling bang was heard by 
the crew of the Polar Prince. 

540
00:33:14,360 --> 00:33:16,000
Here's a recording of that 
sound. 

541
00:33:16,040 --> 00:33:37,400
It is difficult to hear. 
Titan disappeared from the 

542
00:33:37,400 --> 00:33:40,200
tracking system and all 
communications were lost 

543
00:33:41,400 --> 00:33:43,960
throughout the day. 
The operations team on the Polar

544
00:33:43,960 --> 00:33:46,960
Prince conducted its standard 
missed communication protocols 

545
00:33:46,960 --> 00:33:51,000
in an attempt to reach Titan. 
As of 3:00 PM, Titan was 

546
00:33:51,000 --> 00:33:54,200
officially missing and the Polar
Prince crew contacted the 

547
00:33:54,200 --> 00:33:57,280
Canadian Coast Guard to report 
Titan was in distress. 

548
00:33:58,400 --> 00:34:01,000
However, they were advised that 
their location was in the 

549
00:34:01,000 --> 00:34:04,320
jurisdiction of the US Coast 
Guard Rescue Coordination Center

550
00:34:04,320 --> 00:34:06,640
in Boston, and the call was 
patched through. 

551
00:34:07,520 --> 00:34:10,800
Coast Guard personnel in Boston 
initiated A multinational rescue

552
00:34:10,800 --> 00:34:14,000
operation, deeming Titan and its
occupants to be in grave or 

553
00:34:14,000 --> 00:34:20,159
imminent danger. 11 vessels and 
four aircraft searched 12,145 

554
00:34:20,159 --> 00:34:23,120
square nautical miles of ocean 
for possible survivors and 

555
00:34:23,120 --> 00:34:26,159
debris from Titan. 
The search and rescue response 

556
00:34:26,159 --> 00:34:28,639
for Titan was called 
unprecedented by the Coast 

557
00:34:28,639 --> 00:34:30,480
Guard's After Action Report 
Board. 

558
00:34:31,920 --> 00:34:37,120
On June 22nd, 2023 at 8:40 AM, 
the remotely operated vessel 

559
00:34:37,120 --> 00:34:40,920
Odysseus from Pelagic Research 
Services discovered the Titan's 

560
00:34:40,920 --> 00:34:45,000
tail cone, titanium Dome, and 
coupling ring, as well as other 

561
00:34:45,000 --> 00:34:47,360
scattered debris of the Titan on
the sea floor. 

562
00:34:48,760 --> 00:34:52,080
This provided search and rescue 
personnel conclusive evidence of

563
00:34:52,080 --> 00:34:55,280
the instantaneous and 
catastrophic implosion of Titan 

564
00:34:55,600 --> 00:34:57,840
and the death of all five people
on board. 

565
00:34:58,600 --> 00:35:01,120
Video footage of this discovery 
is chilling. 

566
00:35:01,920 --> 00:35:05,040
No mayday message or other 
distress calls were ever sent by

567
00:35:05,040 --> 00:35:08,560
Titan. 
Those still involved with Ocean 

568
00:35:08,560 --> 00:35:11,520
Gate were shocked, stunned, and 
saddened by the loss. 

569
00:35:11,920 --> 00:35:15,400
Former employees mourned, but 
most fully expected something 

570
00:35:15,400 --> 00:35:16,880
like this would happen 
eventually. 

571
00:35:17,960 --> 00:35:20,520
News of Titan's failure rippled 
around the world like a 

572
00:35:20,520 --> 00:35:23,240
shockwave. 
The once highly touted 

573
00:35:23,240 --> 00:35:26,320
submersible that took paying 
customers to see the Titanic had

574
00:35:26,320 --> 00:35:29,000
suffered a similar fate as the 
legendary ship. 

575
00:35:30,040 --> 00:35:33,680
Early jokes about naming the 
vessel Titan were suddenly no 

576
00:35:33,680 --> 00:35:37,240
longer funny. 
Response from the general public

577
00:35:37,240 --> 00:35:41,880
ranged from sadness to outrage. 
Ocean Gates first official 

578
00:35:41,880 --> 00:35:44,960
statement following the loss of 
Titan reads in part. 

579
00:35:45,720 --> 00:35:48,960
This is an extremely sad time 
for our dedicated employees who 

580
00:35:48,960 --> 00:35:51,680
are exhausted and grieving 
deeply over this loss. 

581
00:35:52,480 --> 00:35:55,240
The entire Ocean Gate family is 
deeply grateful for the 

582
00:35:55,240 --> 00:35:58,040
countless men and women from 
multiple organizations of the 

583
00:35:58,040 --> 00:36:01,440
international community who 
expedited wide-ranging resources

584
00:36:01,480 --> 00:36:03,560
and have worked so very hard on 
this mission. 

585
00:36:03,880 --> 00:36:08,040
This is a very sad time for the 
entire Explorer community and 

586
00:36:08,040 --> 00:36:10,520
for each of the family members 
of those lost at sea. 

587
00:36:11,160 --> 00:36:13,880
We respectfully ask that the 
privacy of these families be 

588
00:36:13,880 --> 00:36:15,880
respected during this most 
painful time. 

589
00:36:17,520 --> 00:36:20,560
Just days after the incident, 
the Deputy Commandant of U.S. 

590
00:36:20,560 --> 00:36:23,480
Coast Guard Operations issued an
order for a Marine Board of 

591
00:36:23,480 --> 00:36:25,800
Investigation to examine the 
loss of Titan. 

592
00:36:26,720 --> 00:36:29,640
The board was headed by Mr. 
Jason Neubauer of the Coast 

593
00:36:29,640 --> 00:36:32,520
Guard's Office of Investigations
and Casualty Analysis. 

594
00:36:33,520 --> 00:36:36,240
Evidence collection was a joint 
effort in conjunction with the 

595
00:36:36,240 --> 00:36:38,120
National Transportation Safety 
Board. 

596
00:36:38,840 --> 00:36:41,280
Multiple other federal agencies 
were involved in the 

597
00:36:41,280 --> 00:36:46,160
investigation, including the 
FBI. the United Kingdom, Canada,

598
00:36:46,200 --> 00:36:49,640
and France were named as 
substantially interested states 

599
00:36:49,760 --> 00:36:52,720
according to International 
Maritime Organization protocols,

600
00:36:53,000 --> 00:36:55,000
and were also involved in the 
investigation. 

601
00:36:56,320 --> 00:37:00,080
A public hearing was held in 
September of 2023, during which 

602
00:37:00,080 --> 00:37:03,160
26 witnesses gave testimony over
9 days. 

603
00:37:04,280 --> 00:37:07,280
Key witnesses included former 
Ocean Gate employees Tony 

604
00:37:07,280 --> 00:37:11,400
Neeson, Phil Brooks, David 
Lockridge, Ocean Gate contractor

605
00:37:11,400 --> 00:37:14,880
Tim Catterson, American Bureau 
of Shipping senior principal 

606
00:37:14,880 --> 00:37:19,720
engineer Roy Thomas, NTSB 
engineer Don Kramer, and owner 

607
00:37:19,720 --> 00:37:23,320
of the Roatan Institute of Deep 
Sea Exploration Carl Stanley. 

608
00:37:23,960 --> 00:37:26,760
During the hearings, Stanley 
gave passionate testimony 

609
00:37:26,760 --> 00:37:29,920
regarding the unknown danger he 
had been in during Titan test 

610
00:37:29,920 --> 00:37:31,880
dives. 
You heard a portion of that 

611
00:37:31,880 --> 00:37:33,800
testimony at the top of this 
episode. 

612
00:37:34,880 --> 00:37:37,880
Many others gave similar 
testimony, including David 

613
00:37:37,880 --> 00:37:40,720
Lockridge, who was not employed 
by Ocean Gate at the time of 

614
00:37:40,720 --> 00:37:44,200
Titan's loss. 
However, his testimony described

615
00:37:44,200 --> 00:37:46,200
the company's LAX safety 
culture. 

616
00:37:46,800 --> 00:37:51,880
That meeting turned out to be a 
two hour, 10 minute discussion 

617
00:37:51,920 --> 00:37:57,120
on my termination and how my 
disagreements with the 

618
00:37:57,120 --> 00:38:01,360
organization with regards to 
safety didn't matter. 

619
00:38:01,800 --> 00:38:03,560
This report, I was asked to do 
it. 

620
00:38:03,920 --> 00:38:08,760
Now, if it'd been a case of the 
report, I hadn't been asked to 

621
00:38:08,760 --> 00:38:10,680
do an inspection of it, I would 
have done 1. 

622
00:38:11,080 --> 00:38:15,280
You know, I mean, that that belt
Titan sub was weeks away from 

623
00:38:15,280 --> 00:38:19,080
getting handed off to myself. 
And through that whole built 

624
00:38:19,080 --> 00:38:21,960
process, seeing all those 
components, I was appalled. 

625
00:38:22,440 --> 00:38:26,120
So either way, whether I did a 
report on the 18th of January or

626
00:38:26,120 --> 00:38:28,400
whether I did a report say it 
was March, it was going to be 

627
00:38:28,400 --> 00:38:33,400
ready, whatever I would have on 
paper put down my concerns 

628
00:38:33,400 --> 00:38:38,840
because I was dismissed on every
single occasion from chief 

629
00:38:38,840 --> 00:38:44,200
operating officer, CEO, even the
media and marketing manager, all

630
00:38:44,200 --> 00:38:46,360
an engineering director, the lot
on them. 

631
00:38:46,560 --> 00:38:49,400
The only other director that 
that agreed with me on my 

632
00:38:49,400 --> 00:38:53,440
concerns was was Bonnie. 
That was it. 

633
00:38:54,480 --> 00:38:57,960
The contractors that were 
working for me, Tim Carterson 

634
00:38:58,720 --> 00:39:01,160
and Chris Iams voiced their 
concerns. 

635
00:39:01,680 --> 00:39:04,080
You helped Tim yesterday state 
to you that he would never get 

636
00:39:04,080 --> 00:39:06,040
in that sub. 
Chris told them he would never 

637
00:39:06,040 --> 00:39:09,080
get in that sub. 
Now Tim's probably got 30-40 

638
00:39:09,080 --> 00:39:12,800
years of experience in sobs. 
Sure, Simes run Delta submarines

639
00:39:12,800 --> 00:39:16,240
for 20 plus years. 
You know at one point he 

640
00:39:16,240 --> 00:39:19,600
probably done more dives than 
anybody else in the industry. 

641
00:39:20,560 --> 00:39:24,120
They refused to dive this up. 
They voiced their concerns. 

642
00:39:24,120 --> 00:39:27,680
It wasn't just me, other people 
did and they were dismissed. 

643
00:39:27,680 --> 00:39:30,560
They were dismissed by Tony. 
They were dismissed by the CEO. 

644
00:39:31,400 --> 00:39:34,040
I would never have got in that 
thing from the get go. 

645
00:39:34,560 --> 00:39:38,240
Tony Nessen, Engineering 
Director, gave me 0 confidence 

646
00:39:38,560 --> 00:39:42,440
and a product that I personally 
was supposed to be the chief 

647
00:39:42,440 --> 00:39:47,240
pilot for or have under my care 
as a director of Marine 

648
00:39:47,240 --> 00:39:49,280
operations. 
Hands down. 

649
00:39:49,280 --> 00:39:51,720
I would never go on that thing 
and I wouldn't have. 

650
00:39:53,920 --> 00:39:57,840
Yay to bruise the streaming king
with quantum fiber in it. 

651
00:39:58,080 --> 00:40:01,480
He's gonna binge. 
He wants more. 

652
00:40:01,480 --> 00:40:05,640
He's got to have more of the 
time to drive more podcasts in 

653
00:40:05,640 --> 00:40:07,800
the shower. 
Quantum fiber Wi-Fi has the 

654
00:40:07,800 --> 00:40:10,960
power more more more fast 
Internet speeds. 

655
00:40:10,960 --> 00:40:13,920
Got the geeks to go big. 
Bring them the game right now 

656
00:40:13,960 --> 00:40:16,760
and is royal we more sports 
nonstop. 

657
00:40:16,840 --> 00:40:20,080
Is quantum fibers on top? 
Switch today at 

658
00:40:20,080 --> 00:40:22,360
quantumfiber.com. 
Limited availability, service 

659
00:40:22,360 --> 00:40:23,480
and speed and select locations 
only. 

660
00:40:25,240 --> 00:40:27,600
The Marine Board of 
Investigation Marine Casualty 

661
00:40:27,600 --> 00:40:30,320
Report was published on August 
4th, 2025. 

662
00:40:30,960 --> 00:40:33,880
As described in the narrative 
you heard throughout the series,

663
00:40:34,040 --> 00:40:37,160
the investigation uncovered a 
long history of wide-ranging 

664
00:40:37,160 --> 00:40:40,320
problems associated with Ocean 
Gate and the Titan submersible. 

665
00:40:40,880 --> 00:40:44,800
The 335 page document thoroughly
describes the history of the 

666
00:40:44,800 --> 00:40:48,760
project, details of all the 
vessels involved, dive logs, 

667
00:40:48,760 --> 00:40:51,800
maps, witness statements, and 
its conclusions and 

668
00:40:51,800 --> 00:40:56,880
recommendations. 
In summary, the MBI wrote, Ocean

669
00:40:56,880 --> 00:40:59,400
Gate's failure to follow 
established engineering 

670
00:40:59,400 --> 00:41:03,200
protocols for safety testing and
maintenance of their submersible

671
00:41:03,200 --> 00:41:06,800
was the primary causal factor, 
with the event initiating the 

672
00:41:06,800 --> 00:41:09,440
loss being the loss of 
structural integrity of the 

673
00:41:09,440 --> 00:41:12,760
Titan's carbon fiber hull. 
This loss of structural 

674
00:41:12,760 --> 00:41:15,480
integrity caused the sudden 
catastrophic implosion of the 

675
00:41:15,480 --> 00:41:18,520
hull. 
Many failures by Ocean Gate were

676
00:41:18,520 --> 00:41:21,000
outlined in the Coast Guard's 
Marine Casualty Report. 

677
00:41:21,720 --> 00:41:25,480
This is an extremely long list, 
but in short, these include 

678
00:41:25,480 --> 00:41:28,440
design and test procedures that 
did not address fundamental 

679
00:41:28,440 --> 00:41:31,800
engineering principles, no 
meaningful analysis to determine

680
00:41:31,800 --> 00:41:35,320
the life cycle of the hull, and 
over reliance on its acoustic 

681
00:41:35,320 --> 00:41:37,560
monitoring system to gauge hole 
integrity. 

682
00:41:38,000 --> 00:41:40,760
Failure to interpret the 
monitoring system data after 

683
00:41:40,760 --> 00:41:44,480
problematic events, failure to 
inspect hull integrity after 

684
00:41:44,480 --> 00:41:47,400
significant incidents and 
lacking even procedures to do 

685
00:41:47,400 --> 00:41:49,640
so. 
Failure to conduct crucial 

686
00:41:49,640 --> 00:41:52,440
testing and a toxic corporate 
culture. 

687
00:41:53,160 --> 00:41:55,560
The Coast Guard was heavily 
critical of Ocean Gates 

688
00:41:55,560 --> 00:41:59,240
operations, saying the company 
suffered from severe financial 

689
00:41:59,240 --> 00:42:02,360
instability, high employee 
turnover, and a lack of 

690
00:42:02,360 --> 00:42:05,680
professionally qualified staff, 
which critically undermined its 

691
00:42:05,680 --> 00:42:09,440
ability to maintain safety and 
operational integrity, calling 

692
00:42:09,440 --> 00:42:11,760
the loss of Titan a preventable 
tragedy. 

693
00:42:13,280 --> 00:42:16,040
The report goes on to cite 
Stockton Rush personally for 

694
00:42:16,040 --> 00:42:19,200
misrepresenting partnerships and
certifications to skirt 

695
00:42:19,200 --> 00:42:22,800
regulations, misrepresenting 
Titan's safety record with false

696
00:42:22,800 --> 00:42:25,840
data, misleading paying 
customers regarding testing 

697
00:42:25,840 --> 00:42:29,480
procedures, and exaggerating the
number of tests done on Titan's 

698
00:42:29,480 --> 00:42:33,280
final carbon fiber hull. 
According to the Coast Guard, 

699
00:42:33,280 --> 00:42:35,880
Stockton Rush would have been 
referred to the Department of 

700
00:42:35,880 --> 00:42:39,160
Justice had he survived for 
negligence resulting in the 

701
00:42:39,160 --> 00:42:44,320
deaths of four passengers. 
In conclusion, and I don't often

702
00:42:44,320 --> 00:42:48,240
do this, but I want to offer my 
personal perspective, I have 

703
00:42:48,240 --> 00:42:51,320
researched countless shipwrecks 
and poured over hundreds of 

704
00:42:51,320 --> 00:42:53,440
witness statements and accident 
reports. 

705
00:42:54,080 --> 00:42:57,920
I have never been so infuriated 
and appalled while writing an 

706
00:42:57,920 --> 00:43:02,240
episode for this podcast. 
I have never before read of such

707
00:43:02,240 --> 00:43:05,640
incredible negligence, willful 
misrepresentation of truth, 

708
00:43:06,040 --> 00:43:09,680
shocking ignorance of safety 
protocols in endangerment of 

709
00:43:09,680 --> 00:43:13,920
human lives, including his own. 
Some have labeled Stockton 

710
00:43:13,920 --> 00:43:17,360
Rushes arrogant, spoiled, 
narcissistic and vain. 

711
00:43:18,280 --> 00:43:21,640
Perhaps and likely, he was all 
of those things, at least to 

712
00:43:21,640 --> 00:43:24,920
some people. 
James Cameron, the film director

713
00:43:24,920 --> 00:43:27,760
who had been on dives to the 
Titanic over 30 times, was 

714
00:43:27,760 --> 00:43:31,280
saddened by the loss of Titan 
but had his concerns all along 

715
00:43:31,280 --> 00:43:34,160
about the carbon fiber, calling 
it a horrible idea. 

716
00:43:34,360 --> 00:43:37,760
Adding we all knew that the 
danger was delamination and 

717
00:43:37,760 --> 00:43:41,400
progressive failure over time 
with microscopic water ingress, 

718
00:43:41,520 --> 00:43:44,720
what they call cycling fatigue. 
And we knew if the sub passed 

719
00:43:44,720 --> 00:43:47,400
its pressure test, it wasn't 
going to fail on its first dive.

720
00:43:47,600 --> 00:43:50,440
But it's going to fail over 
time, which is insidious. 

721
00:43:50,960 --> 00:43:53,240
You don't get that with steel or
titanium. 

722
00:43:54,800 --> 00:43:58,240
Expedition Discovery host Josh 
Gates labeled Stockton Rush as a

723
00:43:58,240 --> 00:44:01,560
salesman. 
Rush was charismatic and could 

724
00:44:01,560 --> 00:44:04,840
be charming, and much like a 
salesman, he often said whatever

725
00:44:04,840 --> 00:44:07,440
was necessary to produce a 
positive result for him. 

726
00:44:07,440 --> 00:44:10,560
In Ocean Gate, he surrounded 
himself with people who would 

727
00:44:10,560 --> 00:44:14,160
tell him yes, and anyone who did
not wasn't around very long. 

728
00:44:15,280 --> 00:44:18,520
This is a sign of ineffective 
leadership in any industry, and 

729
00:44:18,520 --> 00:44:21,360
in the case of Ocean Gate, 
people's lives were at risk. 

730
00:44:22,720 --> 00:44:25,800
The Silicon Valley trope of move
fast and break things is 

731
00:44:25,800 --> 00:44:29,120
perfectly fine in many cases, 
and innovation requires forward 

732
00:44:29,120 --> 00:44:33,000
thinking and accepting risk. 
Stockton Rush accepted risk to a

733
00:44:33,000 --> 00:44:35,560
fault and put others at risk as 
a result. 

734
00:44:36,440 --> 00:44:39,920
Much like the case of Elizabeth 
Holmes at Theranos, Rush had a 

735
00:44:39,920 --> 00:44:43,040
pattern for misrepresenting 
facts and reckless disregard for

736
00:44:43,040 --> 00:44:45,920
safety that resulted in the 
deaths of five people, including

737
00:44:45,920 --> 00:44:49,400
himself, when the Titan 
submersible imploded on June 

738
00:44:49,400 --> 00:44:54,160
18th, 2023. 
In a 2021 interview, Rush 

739
00:44:54,160 --> 00:44:57,480
quipped to reporters, I'd like 
to be remembered as an 

740
00:44:57,480 --> 00:44:59,680
innovator. 
I think it was General Douglas 

741
00:44:59,680 --> 00:45:02,480
MacArthur who said you 
remembered for the rules you 

742
00:45:02,480 --> 00:45:04,880
break, and I've broken some 
rules to make this. 

743
00:45:05,000 --> 00:45:07,560
I think I've broken them with 
logic and good engineering 

744
00:45:07,560 --> 00:45:11,760
behind me. 
In the end, Stockton Rush is in 

745
00:45:11,760 --> 00:45:15,880
fact remembered for the rules he
broke, but he is not remembered 

746
00:45:15,880 --> 00:45:19,760
for logic and good engineering. 
So many warned Stockton Rush 

747
00:45:19,760 --> 00:45:22,440
that a failure could happen, 
even that it was probable. 

748
00:45:23,280 --> 00:45:26,600
Whether it was his hubris, 
desire for a financial gain or 

749
00:45:26,600 --> 00:45:30,200
fame, or to make history like 
his ancestors, Stockton Rush 

750
00:45:30,200 --> 00:45:32,120
will be remembered now for his 
failure. 

751
00:45:33,040 --> 00:45:36,320
The families that are left 
behind have grieved and will no 

752
00:45:36,320 --> 00:45:39,600
doubt continue to do so, and 
they will endure knowing this 

753
00:45:39,600 --> 00:45:42,000
tragedy was entirely 
preventable. 

754
00:45:43,960 --> 00:45:46,800
The vast majority of research 
done for this series comes from 

755
00:45:46,800 --> 00:45:49,360
the report of the Marine Board 
of Investigation into the 

756
00:45:49,360 --> 00:45:52,360
Implosion of the Submersible 
Titan by the United States Coast

757
00:45:52,360 --> 00:45:56,000
Guard Marine Board of 
Investigation and Hall Failure 

758
00:45:56,000 --> 00:45:58,680
and Implosion of Submersible 
Titan from the National 

759
00:45:58,680 --> 00:46:02,280
Transportation Safety Board. 
I have read every word of both 

760
00:46:02,280 --> 00:46:05,560
these documents, several 100 
pages, and they are filled with 

761
00:46:05,560 --> 00:46:08,920
details that give a fascinating 
and frustrating look into Ocean 

762
00:46:08,920 --> 00:46:10,960
Gate Operations and Stockton 
Rush. 

763
00:46:12,160 --> 00:46:14,920
These documents are available on
this episode's page at 

764
00:46:14,920 --> 00:46:18,920
Shipwrecks and seadogs.com or 
directly through each agency's 

765
00:46:18,920 --> 00:46:22,080
website. 
That's going to do it for the 

766
00:46:22,080 --> 00:46:25,360
Ocean Gate Titan submersible. 
A preventable tragedy. 

767
00:46:25,520 --> 00:46:27,600
Thank you so much for listening 
to this series. 

768
00:46:28,120 --> 00:46:30,720
Shipwrecks and Sea Dogs is 
written, edited and produced by 

769
00:46:30,720 --> 00:46:34,320
me, Rich Napolitano. 
Original theme music is by Sean 

770
00:46:34,320 --> 00:46:36,720
Sigfried. 
For AD free listening, please 

771
00:46:36,720 --> 00:46:40,200
subscribe at 
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772
00:46:40,200 --> 00:46:43,320
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773
00:46:44,000 --> 00:46:47,360
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774
00:46:47,360 --> 00:46:49,360
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For joining, go to 

775
00:46:49,360 --> 00:46:52,040
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776
00:46:52,960 --> 00:46:55,960
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777
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778
00:47:00,360 --> 00:47:03,280
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779
00:47:04,320 --> 00:47:06,760
Last but not least, please be 
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780
00:47:06,760 --> 00:47:10,040
Shipwrecks and Sea Dogs on 
Spotify, Apple Podcasts, or 

781
00:47:10,040 --> 00:47:13,760
wherever you listen to podcasts.
Please join me again next time. 

782
00:47:14,520 --> 00:47:18,840
And as always, don't forget to 
wear your. 

783
00:47:19,360 --> 00:47:21,800
Granger knows that as a 
procurement coordinator in a 

784
00:47:21,800 --> 00:47:24,920
manufacturing plant, you can 
count on auto reordering to have

785
00:47:24,920 --> 00:47:28,440
the PPE you need on hand. 
Call 1800 Granger, 

786
00:47:28,520 --> 00:47:31,440
clickgranger.com or just stop by
Granger. 

787
00:47:31,640 --> 00:47:33,120
Are the ones. 
Who get it done. 

788
00:47:35,040 --> 00:47:38,680
In 1968, Cyclone Giselle 
battered New Zealand and 

789
00:47:38,680 --> 00:47:41,880
converged with another powerful 
storm arriving from Antarctica. 

790
00:47:42,440 --> 00:47:45,680
The passenger ferry Wahine was 
caught in this deadly maelstrom 

791
00:47:45,680 --> 00:47:49,800
in the Cook Strait, resulting in
the ship capsizing and 51 people

792
00:47:49,800 --> 00:47:53,720
losing their lives. 
Listen to the Wahine shipwreck 

793
00:47:53,760 --> 00:47:56,560
and New Zealand's deadliest 
storm, available now on 

794
00:47:56,560 --> 00:47:59,880
Shipwrecks and Sea Dogs, tales 
of mishaps, misfortune and 

795
00:47:59,880 --> 00:48:02,440
misadventure. 
Listen wherever you get your 

796
00:48:02,440 --> 00:48:03,200
podcasts.